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By Reginald Herbold Green
Why is an expert like a farmer?
Each is a man outstanding in his field.
- Technical Assistance Joke
Too often many governments, my own included 
have thought they knew what was best 
for peasant farmers.
- Mwalimu Julius Nyerere
I.
INTRODUCTION - THE PDP AND MOZAMBIQUE
This is primarily a paper sketching the broad goals, strategies and some of 
the components of Mozambique's Priority District Programme. The PDP is one 
of two main priorities in the reconstruction of rural society, restoration 
of rural services and rehabilitation of rural livelihoods in Mozambique.
The other is the return of internally and externally displaced war-affected 
households to their homes and the restoration of livelihoods and civil 
society for these returnados and for the rural families who have not fled 
but whose homes and production base have been devastated by the South 
African instigated and managed war of terrorist aggression against 
Mozambique. In the 40 districts to be included in the PDP, these two 
priorities interact in principle and will do so in practice but 
rehabilitation for human and political reasons has to have national 
geographic coverage while economic, personnel and security1 constraints 
render extension of PDP to all 130 odd districts impracticable for at least 
3 to 5 years.
2The PDP approach is perceived as central in six senses:
1. creating an opportunity for absolutely poor households (60 to 65% in 
rural Mozambique including displaced persons2) to produce their way to 
less humanly and socially disastrous levels;
2. parallel to and sustained by rehabilitation and broadening of access to 
basic infrastructure and productive services;
3. restoring (achieving)3 national and rural household food security by 
increases in both household self-provisioning and commercialised 
production;
4. reflating the severely depressed urban and industrial sectors by 
expanding rural markets for their potential production;
5. contributing to rebuilding of Mozambique's industrial raw material and 
export bases;
6. strengthening rural sector familial (small household producers) 
participation in governance both by involving them in decisions on 
programme design in each district and by recreating a significant set 
of public services in rural areas for them to be involved in governing 
via district and provincial assemblies/councils.4
Economic - Human - Equity - Political Foci
It is therefore an economic (production and productivity oriented), human 
investment (health/education/agricultural knowledge), equity (reduction of 
absolute poverty/increase in effective access to basic services and 
political (involvement in governance and increase in public service 
provision) oriented approach. It is not perceived as either an alternative 
to, nor an add on decoration for, the ongoing Structural Adjustment 
Programme (PRE - Economic Rectification Programme in Mozambican 
terminology) but as integral to it.
Selection is by district not - in general - by social group or degree of 
poverty. This is partly a matter of realism - differentiating among 
absolutely poor, poor and not so poor sector familial households would be 
very difficult and targeting most programmes on such divisions well nigh 
impossible. Another factor is common sense logic - basic infrastructure
3and basic services are needed by all human beings and (at least in 
Mozambique) their provision as widely as possible is perceived as a basic 
responsibility of government. The practical way to achieve access for 
absolutely poor households is to move rapidly toward universal access and 
to avoid fee or administrative patterns which exclude poor people. Third 
is a pragmatic consideration - even Chairman Mao defined the goal of a 
responsible, effective rural economic strategy as "all boats float higher". 
This is particularly true in respect to recreating a rural commercial 
network to sell consumer goods and production/construction inputs, to buy 
produce and to transport the goods sold and produce purchased to and from 
points accessible to rural households.
However, the orientation of the programme to the sector familial is a 
social, political and economic one. It is doubtless ideological in the 
sense of believing "no nation can be great and prosperous the majority of 
whose people are poor and miserable". However, since the source of that 
quotation is Adam Smith and the basis of PDP's production enhancement is to 
be from private household production to describe the PDP as inherently 
statist, let alone Marxist-Leninist would appear somewhat obscurantist. It 
is an economic decision because it places the main focus of renewed rural 
production on small family enterprises not larger private farms nor private 
or public sector corporate production units. These are perceived as being 
too capital, foreign exchange, skilled personnel, technology and middle or 
high level entrepreneur intensive to be viable/practicable main ways 
forward despite their uses as complements or in specific crops (e.g. sugar, 
tea). Separate programmes to encourage and support them do exist or are 
envisaged but ones secondary to the PDP in political attention, proposed 
personnel and intended resource allocations/3
Organisational Challenges
Organisationally the PDP is intended to avoid four failings of past rural 
development efforts in SSA:
1. providing a reasonable package of infrastructure and basic services but 
not, in fact, enabling households to produce and to commercialise 
significantly more than before;
2. anarchically independent programmes by different ministries so that
water, education, health, transport, credit research and extension
4programmes did not coordinate with each other and, as a result, the 
whole tended to be less than the sum of its parts;
3. creating separate multi purpose project or area administrations outside 
normal governmental structures to by-pass coordination and other 
bureaucratic problems but creating insoluble accountability, 
sustainability and conflict with government problems as well as greatly 
impeding any overall improvement of the excluded main line service 
provision administration and governance institutions;
4. failing to ask the intended rural beneficiaries about their needs, 
possibilities and practices before design, to secure comment and 
approval of programmes from them or to involve them in monitoring with 
serious operational attention to their criticisms and suggestions.
Coordination at national, provincial and district levels; use of existing 
institutions (with strengthening) and creation of a special central 
institution only for the agricultural production enabling aspects as well 
as pre-consultation with the sector familial are being stressed. How 
successful PDP will be in resolving the weaknesses cited is problematic - 
at the least it does see the problems and the questions relatively clearly.
II.
AND NAMIBIA ?
The primary interest of Mozambique's rural policy to Namibians is in what 
insights they may provide for how to (or how not to) tackle Namibia's rural 
reconstruction and development. Quite clearly Namibia is not Mozambique 
historically, ecologically, politically or in terms of present and 
potential output mixes. However, there are a number of parallels which may 
make Mozambican experience since independence (sketched in the next 
section) and the PDP initiative to transform that experience (outlined in 
the fourth section) of interest to Namibians.
These common factors include:
1. lack of any historic orientation of research and extension services to 
small scale farmers in respect either to crops, livestock or forestry
5with a resultant lack of adequate knowledge of African rural household 
income and expenditure, gender, intra household budgetary, time use, 
seasonal and other characteristics (slightly alleviated in Namibia by 
non-governmental studies);
2. devastation of large portions of the small scale rural household sector 
by war;
3. weak basic service provision in rural areas worsened by war;
4. pre-independence settler sector dominance in commercialised production 
with a substantial, specialised network of public and private support 
service and marketing structures (since collapsed in Mozambique);
5. lack of state capacity to hold together the medium and large scale 
commercial agricultural sector if proprietors left (e.g. the North 
Central abandoned ranches in SWA as it then was);
6. the near total immediate post-independence dependence of the 
agricultural support, service and marketing structures on middle and 
high level personnel of European ancestry and - therefore - the 
importance of the proportion of these personnel choosing to remain as 
citizens (catastrophically low - at most 10% - in Mozambique);
7. the need to achieve social, physical and economic rehabilitation after 
war for rural households comprising a substantial proportion of the 
total rural population (300,000 dislocated persons in Namibia according 
to CCN estimates plus perhaps 40,000 of the returning refugees or 20% 
of Namibia's total population of 1,750,000&);
8. the lack of food security for substantial numbers of rural households 
and the fragility of national food security (initially because of 
domestic factors in Mozambique and because of heavy external sourcing 
in Mozambique and Namibia today);
9. severe limitations on initial numbers of, and training capacity for 
agricultural (including livestock) extension and support personnel for 
broad access, small farming household service provision (and of field 
and user tested knowledge and techniques for them to extend);
610. limited state resources available for rural development as a result of 
the patterns of transition (albeit specific costs are flight of 
settlers and war in Mozambique and reconciliation costs, e.g. not 
cutting bloated pay-rolls and pay-levels and servicing inherited debts 
of the illegal administration in Namibia'');
11. restoring physical security in rural areas (which apparently still 
remains at risk in parts of Namibia even if not comparable in extent or 
degree to large areas of Mozambique);
12. an initial state administrative and bureaucratic structure of great 
complexity and formalism which - even with altered policies and 
personnel - relates and communicates with great difficulty to scattered 
households with low levels of education especially because historically 
it was not concerned with their well-being and interpreted governance 
in respect to them as meaning only top down rule.”
These common factors do not cover the whole of agricultural, rural society 
and the rural development challenge as perceived by rural households 
engaged in small scale production in either country. A similar, equally 
important, but equally partial, list of common factors can be constructed 
between Namibia and Botswana and a slightly narrower one in respect to 
Namibia and Zimbabwe. All three are relevant and most relevant when 
considered together in the Namibian context (or more accurately contexts,
e.g. Eastern Caprivi is not the Oshana country is not Bethanie is not the 
Otavi Highlands).
III.
THE SECTOR FAMILIAL FROM PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA TO 1989
Colonial Mozambique
Colonial Mozambique's agriculture had three distinct sectors: plantations; 
medium and small scale settler farmers and the sector familial (ranging 
from moderate sized commercial to tiny sub-subsistence units). Further, it 
was divided geographically into North-Centre-South by crops and by balance 
among the sectors.
7The North (Cabo Delgado, Niasa, Nampula Provinces) was the least 
significant in commercialised output. Export crop production (especially 
cotton) was mixed plantation, settler, compulsory sector familial while 
food surpluses were partly sector familial and partly settler. Overall the 
sector familial was dominant and probably most similar to the 'normal' Sub- 
Saharan African household self-provisioning plus secondary sales model.
The Centre (Zambia, Sofala, Tete, Manica) was the dominant export crop 
producing zone (especially sugar, tea, cashew) and also had substantial 
commercialised food production. The plantation sector (a heritage of the 
near sovereign company era in many districts) was dominant with settlers 
important in Tete (a grain basket) and the sector familial relatively 
weaker than in the other two zones. As in the North (and unlike the South) 
grains and root crops are both significant staples albeit usually in 
different districts with grain more highland and cassava more 
lowland/coastal in concentration. Many sector familial households were 
dependent on wage income (usually from plantation or settlers) to augment 
inadequate household production. Because of tax induced and de facto 
forced labour at low wages impact on sector familial labour power, it is 
likely that this dependence on wage earnings was in most cases determined 
by the laws of colonial political economy not of ecology and technology.
The South (Gaza, Inhambane, Maputo) had relatively few plantations, the 
largest number of settler farmers and the most diverse sector familial sub­
sector. Its commercialised output was primarily food (plus sugar from 
plantations which was partly for export) because of the concentration of 
urban population in Lorenco Marques as it then was. While some sector 
familial households had local wage dependence patterns similar to those of 
the Centre, the predominant source of wage incomes was the Rand. These 
wages tended to be higher and, in fact, the correlation between household 
purchasing power/farm size and a household member working in the South 
African mines was strongly positive. These remittances made not only a 
substantial contribution to consumption but were the chief source of 
investible surplus for the minority of the sector familial households which 
expanded to medium size with substantial commercialised surpluses above 
household self-provisioning.
The colonial government did not provide services to the sector familial. 
Extension, research, credit and rural education, water, health, were not
8among its concerns. It did provide roads where plantation, settler, 
strategic or Lorenco Marques food supply considerations pertained, albeit 
this produced a pretty broken and sketchy network.
The rural commercial network did, indeed, exist and provided supplies of 
consumer goods and agricultural/home construction inputs, markets for 
produce, transport to and from locations accessible to the sector familial 
and some credit. That sector consisted of primarily Portuguese merchants 
some with shops and warehouses in cities or district centres, virtually all 
with lorries and sale/collection routes. That they were racist and 
exploitative (in the normal use of that term not simply the Marxian 
technical one) is incontestable. What is also incontestable is that they 
did respond to market demand (by the sector familial and for its products) 
and were a vital component of the rural cash economy. Most, quite 
literally, drove off to South Africa, Swaziland, or Rhodesia (as it then 
was) before, at, or soon after independence leaving a near vacuum which has 
yet to be filled.
The sector familial was not technologically static - any more than its 
counterparts in Malawi or Tanzania. The methods of identifying, selecting, 
testing and mastering new technology are unclear - the inputs (e.g. metal 
hand tools, ox ploughs, improved seed, fertiliser) came via the rural 
commercial network quite readily once demand baked by cash existed. Work 
on plantations and - more particularly - settler farms was probably the 
main source of exposure to new opportunities with a bias toward picking the 
smaller and simpler possibilities based both on conservatism (major risk 
avoidance) and limited resources which, in the event, was consistent with 
knowledge constraints and economic viability. The high correlation between 
mine work remittances and farming modernisation/expansion strongly suggests 
that for a not insignificant proportion of sector familial farmers, lack of 
access to credit at non-extortionate rates was a constraint.
Transition and Partial Transformation: 1975-81
Mozambique's transition to independence was - from a skills and production 
perspective - chaotic. 90% of Portuguese settlers had left by 18 months 
after independence. Since most posts from crane and lorry driver up had 
been filled by them, the traumatic impact on production as well as 
government operations was acute. Particularly over 1975-78 this was 
exacerbated by the terrorist and sabotage activities of the bandidos
9armados launched by Rhodesian intelligence as a counter-insurgency 
strategy.
The rural sector was hit by:
a. departure of the vast majority of settler farmers;
b. run-down of plantation operations;
c. driving off (literally) of rural commercial network;
d. falls in number of households receiving domestic and South African wage 
income remittances.
The initial state priority was to keep the modern (settler/plantation) 
sector functioning to preserve urban food supplies, export earnings and 
Mozambican jobs. This was seen as requiring state intervening (takeover ad 
interim) of abandoned or mismanaged units because the technological, import 
and input, financial, managerial and personnel requirements were beyond the 
capacity to cope of the sector familial. The shortage of state resources - 
especially personnel - led to regrouping settler farms into much larger 
units than had been the case in the colonial period.
This initial emphasis was reinforced by technocratic, bureaucratic and 
ideological factors. Initially independent Mozambique's leadership took an 
unrealistically negative view on the potential of (and indeed the existing 
contribution of) the sector familial because of a somewhat ill thought 
through commitment to modernisation and economies of scale. Adminis­
tratively it was easier to concentrate agriculture on a few large units and 
projects and to raise external finance for them than to design broad front 
household extension and support services programmes. The concept of 
individual peasant households as incompatible with social and socialist as 
well as production level transformation somewhat vaguely held by the 
liberation movement was reinforced by its central and eastern European 
(especially German Democratic Republic) and Cuban technical advisers.
With no sector familial oriented extension or support tradition to inherit, 
the income side of rural society was perceived as centring on rural 
employment on large enterprises and large modern communal production units. 
The sector familial oriented agricultural strategy nominally focused on 
communal villages. The Liberation Movement had some experience with these
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during the war in northern Mozambique. Its relevance to peace-time, 
commercializable surplus generating, technologically dynamic production 
throughout Mozambique should have been questioned more than it was in 
prospect (as it was in retrospect from 1978 onward). The foreign 
technicians (especially from the GDR) may have had some large scale co-op 
experience but neither in establishing them from scattered smallholdings 
nor under Mozambican ecological, infrastructural, educational or 
technological constraints. In any event, the large unit strategy ate up 
virtually all the resources available and few went to the communal village 
front.
The exodus of the rural commercial network was initially welcomed - even by 
many in the sector familial. Nasty most of its members had been and it was 
supposed the new public sector wholesale, retail, transport and produce 
buying enterprises would fill the needs for goods to buy and buyers to 
purchase at least as effectively, probably more cheap and certainly more 
civilly. Unfortunately the nature of the vacuum and the absence of 
personnel to design (much less to staff) replacements beyond the 
import/export and wholesale levels was not recognised at independence nor 
fully perceived until well after 1980.
The lorries, drivers and mechanics did not exist. Rural retail trade in 
Africa is rarely efficiently carried out by large centralized chains. 
Incentives to sell produce depend significantly on access to buyers at 
convenient locations and to virtually simultaneous access to desired goods 
to buy. In respect to village operations, specialisation in selling or 
buying or transporting is often uneconomic or at any rate cost inefficient.
A Deceptive Dawn
After the initial dramatic falls in rural output of 1975-77 there was a 
partial recovery. Over 1977-81 most of the output fall was clawed back. 
With goods to buy moderately available, sector familial (virtually all 
household, communal production being negligible throughout) commercialised 
production shared in the recovery. A few of the new large scale production 
schemes appeared on the road to becoming successes.
At the same time, the massive extension of primary education, basic health 
care and drinking water provision to rural areas and the removal of 
colonial administrative oppression improved sector familial morale and
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sense of participation in governance as well as welfare. In addition 
policy was revised to call for additional resource allocation to sector 
familial agricultural services, to allow a free choice between communal and 
household production and to reduce barriers to small scale co-op and 
private participation in rural commerce and transport.
Whether the 1977-81 rural production trend could have continued and the 
parallel policy evolution been adequate under favourable circumstances is 
problematic. The large scale sector was not recovering on a sustainable 
basis - its gobbling up of personnel, subsidies to cover losses, imports 
and inputs was growing cancerously and 'deferred' maintenance was eroding 
the underlying capacity of most units. The apparent initial success of new 
units - such as the Nordic backed Chokwe Irrigation Scheme near Maputo - 
was deceptive as output, while real enough, tended to peak at a quarter of 
target levels and thereafter to fluctuate. And no operational strategy to 
support sector familial production development was ever designed much less 
launched, partly because of lack of finance, personnel and knowledge; 
partly because of bureaucratic inertia but partly - it appears - because 
Ministry of Agriculture personnel (including one or more subsequently 
dismissed ministers) did not give it the priority the Party or President 
Machel did.
In the event these questions became moot - circumstances were anything but 
favourable.
The Price of Pretoria
From mid-1981 through late 1986 over three quarters of Mozambique was swept 
over by a tidal wave of armed aggression and sabotage and burnt up by a 
holocaust of mass terrorism - the regional expression of the Republic of 
South Africa's "total strategy" to render apartheid safe and profitable. 
From December 1986 the tidal wave was halted and from 1988 on substantial 
reduction of the forces of aggression has been achieved in a majority of 
rural districts. The terrorist fires have been harder to quench because 
rural households, hamlets and villages are "soft" targets indefensible by a 
state with limited financial and technical resources facing a mercenary 
force with substantial external logistic and safe base support (as remains 
the case in mid-1990 whatever President de Klerk's formal policy or even 
actual wishes). Further, the very breaking of ba units and the disruption
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of their communications, logistics and command over slave labour food 
producing enclaves has increased foraging raids.
There is no need to outline the overall human, social and economic costs 
South Africa has imposed on Mozambique for resisting apartheid and pursuing 
the dream of independent equitable development. That has been done in 
UNICEF's Children On The Front Line and UNECA/UNARP's South African 
Destabilisation: The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid.*3 
What is relevant here is the impact on the rural condition and the creation 
of the context which as it pertained over mid- 1989-1990 when the PDP was 
formulated.
First, the progress toward provision of basic services was badly damaged 
although a significant core of rural health posts and centres, water 
provision and primary schools has been kept in being and the first two, at 
least, have been re-establishing themselves in newly secure areas since 
mid-1988;
Second, in most of the countryside rural infrastructure from bridges and 
culverts through shops and godowns has been devastated both by terrorism 
and sabotage and by lack of maintenance;
Third, outside a few areas (Zonas Verdes in peri urban areas, a number of 
protectable large scale settlement areas and some rural districts little 
touched by war) no rural extension programme or systematic supply of 
support services has been possible;
Fourth, the loss of vehicles and godowns and the shortage of goods to sell 
has crippled both the public sector wholesale and produce purchasing sector 
and the co-op and private small scale commercial enterprises which had 
emerged over 1978-81;
Fifth, even in some relatively secure areas with local infrastructure and 
transport functional (e.g. the Mueda Plateau in Cabo Delgado) the cutting 
of main transport links has devastated commercialised output because of 
lack of effective market access for sales or purchases;
Sixth, the war and the consequential lack of resources have reduced civil 
governance in many rural districts to very attenuated levels (and in a few 
to virtually nominal existence);
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Seventh, by limiting personnel development and, to some extent, draining 
skilled personnel the war has prevented any sustained increase in public 
(or for that matter private) sector human capacity especially in rural 
areas quite as much as it has blocked institutional and normal functional 
experience development;
Eighth, the macroeconomic consequences of war have crippled government 
finances so that almost all of the capital and of the emergency (survival 
of war displaced persons) and about a half of the basic (excluding defence 
and debt service) recurrent budgets are externally financed;
Ninth, the collapse of urban-rural trade has created a (only half met) need 
of 1.25 million tonnes a year of grain and other basic food imports and 
crippled demand for urban manufactured goods a well as constraining 
expansion of the domestic raw material oriented artisanal (micro 
enterprise) sector;
Tenth, perhaps two-thirds of the rural populations have been forced to move 
at least once; two-fifths are now displaced (in camps or in unsuitable, 
overcrowded, hopefully temporary re-settlement areas; about a tenth are 
refugees outside Mozambique and up to two-thirds are absolutely poor with 
rural child moderate and severe malnutrition at about the same level.
Eleventh, macroeconomic stabilisation and partial recovery (1987-1990 GDP 
growth will average between 4% and 5% a year and commercialised 
agricultural output increase at least as much) has by-passed most rural 
districts and households who are unable to respond to higher prices either 
because of lack of resources to enable them to produce more. Gains have 
been substantial for a minority of households with safe access to land, at 
least minimal basic services and accessible markets stocked with goods. 
Indeed the speed of recovery in certain areas - e.g. coastal cashew 
producing zones and the northeastern cereal and potato basket district of 
Tete province followed improved general security, access to transport 
and/or access to goods to buy has been remarkable.
To The PDP
It was against this background that the political decisions to 
conceptualise the Priority District Programme, to give it high profile 
presentation at the 1989 Consultative Group (of donors) Meeting and to move
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rapidly toward articulation and budgeting for resource mobilisation in 1990 
have been taken.
The commitment to struggle for the liberation of Mozambique and Mozambicans 
from absolute poverty required priority attention to the rural sector 
familial which comprises up to 75% of the population.
The need to raise production and especially food and export production 
required that increasing production and productivity be central to the 
programme - raising rural welfare and incomes by subsidisation was 
financially not on and, with perhaps 30% urban absolute poverty, would 
hardly lead very far toward eradicating absolute poverty.
The past experience with large enterprises and with communal units in 
agriculture demonstrated that for this reason the sector familials' income 
and production increases had to be won at household level not by increased 
agricultural enterprise employment.
Political priority for basic service extension interacted with the 
importance of better health, education an water in increasing present as 
well as future productivity and saving time (e.g. from long distance water 
collection and tending sick persons) and also with the institutional vigour 
and tenacity of Health and Water to make these central to the overall 
approach.
The manifest needs for infrastructure rehabilitation and for initial 
augmentation of sector familial cash incomes (together with the presence of 
food and import support aid counterpart funds and the extreme shortage of 
import capacity) led to or at least facilitated the incorporation of a - 
slightly ill articulated - labour intensive, seasonal and part-time sector 
familial household members employing public works component.
Realisation of the lack of adequate knowledge about the sector familial led 
to a greater readiness to seek information on and from it before designing 
programmes and similar realisation of the cost of the private rural 
commercial network's near absence to the adoption of a highly positive 
attitude toward enabling it to recover and expand.
The clear impossibility of many rural households rehabilitating their own 
livelihood bases without an initial injection of grant or soft loan 
resources (and the hellish problems of tiny loan extension and recovery)
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have led to inclusion of initial grant provision of tools, production 
inputs and household goods (plus, if practicable fiscally, "starter" 
livestock) as a part of creating an "enabling climate" for household 
initiative and production.
The genesis of the attention to gender issues - especially women's workload 
and female-headed households - is less clear. Politically there has been a 
commitment to equal rights and equal access for women at senior political 
levels in Mozambique, but one attenuated in practice by pre-colonial and 
colonial social norms and by bureaucratic inertia and myopia. There is a 
realisation - partly generated by Mozambican women's groups, partly by the 
Nairobi Conference at the end of the 'Women's Decade' and partly by a 
handful of expatriate advisers - that women are overburdened, central to 
food production, head a substantial proportion of households, and are 
disproportionately absolutely poor. This appears to be prompting a more 
positive (if not always well articulated) response at various levels and 
interacts with Health's long standing prioritisation of mother and child 
preventative and curative clinics and vaccination programmes. However, in 
respect to agriculture and to employment this is a priority which has 
become real in principle with a very limited data base or technical 
knowledge fund for its actual implementation.10
IV.
PRIORITY DISTRICT PROGRAMME: TOWARD RECONSTRUCTION AND TRANSFORMATION
Goals and Outline of Content
The goals are to restore rural production - primarily in the sector 
familial - and economic viability as well as rural civil society. By so 
doing, PDPwill both constitute a major component of Mozambique's economic 
rehabilitation and make other components - notably urban food security and 
resuscitation of domestic demand for manufactured goods - practicable.
To restore civil society requires that the 80% of rural households in the 
sector familial (as well as the 10 to 20% in agricultural and non- 
agricultural employment or commercial farming, medium and small scale non­
farm business and the self employed, non-farm artisanal) take part in the 
restored/increased production and have effective access to basic social,
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human and economic services. Basic needs and means to meeting them must be 
central to the PDP if it is to be a social and political success or even - 
given the impracticability of massive large scale public sector and 
implausibility of large and medium scale private sector agricultural units 
producing on the requisite scale - an economic one.
Sector Familial Requirements and Programme Emphases
The need to focus on revival of familial sector output and access to 
services (including economic services) has six implications:
a. broad base programmes - e.g. access to improved seed and basic tools - 
are more important than limited access, capital intensive projects, 
because neither technically nor in the light of financial and import 
constraints can there be enough of the latter to allow the majority of 
the sector familial households to produce more;
b. commercialisation is crucial - the SF households have basic needs 
meeting which requires cash - and requires rehabilitation of the 
enterprise/entrepreneurial as well as of the physical/infrastructural 
elements of the rural commercial network;
c. however, because food security will for most households depend 
primarily on their own production, specific attention must be paid to 
facilitating expansion of own use or household provisioning (so called 
subsistence) production and its more efficient household level 
processing, storage and preservation;
d. because they have direct links to quantity, quality and effectiveness 
of labour for direct production - as well as because they are basic to 
political and social sustainability - primary and adult education, 
basic preventative and curative health and pure water supply (for 
human, and secondarily livestock, use) are crucial to the PDP;
e. so to is specific programme by programme attention to women's needs and 
the actual gender division of labour in order to allow women to produce 
more while lightening - or at least not augmenting - the very heavy 
workload characterising sector familial women when production is 
possible;
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f. integrating (but also articulating for specific differences in needs) 
programme components relating to sector familial households whose 
direct production capacity is relatively undamaged by war or is already 
substantially restored; those formally non-deslocado/ affectado 
households (especially in newly liberated districts) whose household 
production and social bases have been wrecked by war and also 
resettling/rehabilitating economic base of affectado, deslocado and 
returnado families.
The central aims of the programme relate to the absolutely poor - and on 
the verge of absolute poverty - sector familial households. This does not 
mean other social and economic sectors should or can be ignored:
a. rebuilding the rural and small town commercial network is crucial to 
the sector familial and requires substantial strengthening of the 
private (as well as the public) commercial sector;
b. the interests and concerns of the non-agricultural artisanat and of 
employees of enterprises producing for local (or broader rural) sale 
are symbiotic with those of SF households - they provide production 
enabling inputs and production incentivating goods to be available as 
well as a market for agricultural (including livestock, fish, artisanat 
and forestry) products;
c. except in cases of serious land (or good land accessible to transport) 
shortages, private farmers (small capitalist or large family farms with 
hired labour) have interests more compatible with than in contradiction 
to those of the SF households e.g. they provide some seasonal 
employment and encourage traders to serve areas they are in. Their 
success will harm the SF only if it drains a disproportionate share of 
services or engrosses scarce land the SF needs/could use;
d. basic services (i.e. health - education - water - agricultural 
extension - commercial access) should be available to all PDP 
households not only absolutely poor ones (albeit the less poor ones can 
be expected to pay for - e.g. - agricultural inputs whereas initially 
the absolutely poor cannot). Access to them is a basic right of all 
human beings and meeting that right is a duty of the states as 
responsible to all Mozambicans;
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e. the social systems of rural Mozambique are not purely on class, much 
less income level, lines so that a strict means (lack of means) test 
for core services would be very divisive. This would be especially 
true in the period of reconciliation - helping poor ex-bandidos and not 
less poor households who had stood with the state would be politically 
implausible and excluding all ex-bandidos by saying "non poor" (even 
when palpably they were destitute) would abort reconciliation;
f. empirically separating absolutely poor, in danger of becoming 
absolutely poor, slightly less poor households would be tedious, slow 
and probably impracticable.
But the preceding paragraph is a complement to and an elaboration of the 
basic commitment to increasing sector familial household capacity to 
produce, to sell and to buy, and access to services. Therefore, programme 
design should be based on what sector familial households see as their 
basic needs and on ways in which they believe they can satisfy them. 
Programmes not meeting that test will not have much chance of success on 
any criterion.
Sector Familial Household Priorities
The priorities of poor sector familial households can be summarised under 
five heads:
1. Security
2. Economic and Social Survival Safety Nets
3. Livelihood
4. Basic Services
5. Infrastructure for the above
These priorities have rarely been studied systematically and operationally
- and almost never at national level nor in the context of a planning
exercise whether in Mozambique or elsewhere. However, a substantial number 
of micro surveys and a body of - often rather unsystematic - knowledge by 
politicians and others who are (or act as if they were) responsible and 
accountable to poor rural Africans do exist. These can be refined if doing 
so is made a priority a) in research - e.g. by the Centre for African
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Studies and b) in the pre-adoption presentation of the PDP to district 
populations as well as in annual progress reviews. The ongoing political 
process, while essential to back up and provide a context for such work, is 
not by itself adequate even including District and Provincial councils and 
assemblies. First, in many cases it does not provide specific enough ex 
ante needs-requirements in adequate detail to inform strategic programme 
and project design. Second, it is a rather slow and inexact monitoring 
device except for actions so widely and deeply resented or so ineffective 
that any competent observer can also see they have gone wrong. Third, it 
does not usually operate in a way allowing clear choices among alternatives 
on the basis of rural household preference within actual resource 
constraints.
As a result very ill designed and/or cost inefficient (in the sense of 
benefits to rural households per unit of resources used) programmes and 
institutions can be designed, launched and continued with apparent rural 
support (or at least without major disapproval in terms of clear advocacy 
of specified alternatives) even with a participatory political process 
responsible to a rural majority. A clear example of this weakness is 
Tanzania. Tanzania's political process has a clear pro-rural political 
bias demonstrated by resource transfers to the rural sector from the urban 
sector and external sources on a large scale, by systematically raising 
crop prices much more rapidly than even minimum wages (let alone salaries) 
and by reversals of programmes, policies and structures which roused broad, 
sharp rural criticism. But this has guaranteed neither efficiency in 
resource use nor a close correlation between rural household priorities and 
patterns of resource allocation to rural areas.
The Necessity of Security
Security is a necessary condition for meeting other basic needs as well as 
a human need in and of itself. It has four aspects - physical/military; 
social and political setting/administration; access to land and receiving 
a fair return (absence of gross exploitation in the colloquial sense).
Physical security means both the achievement and maintenance of peace and 
the functioning of the police and army within enforced guidelines which 
mean honest, peaceful rural households need not fear them and can, when 
necessary, go to them confidently for assistance. In the context of the
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PDP this means that coordination with the Armed Forces is crucial to ensure 
that the selected Districts are (or become) and remain physically secure.
Socio political/administrative security means achieving a context in which 
there are known, broadly acceptable, relatively stable legal, 
administrative and political frameworks. That context allows people to act 
in confidence that they will not be messed about with and can expect 
support if they go about their business/livelihood/family life in ways 
which they consider socially and politically acceptable. In the PDP 
context this requires retraining/re-educating District Administrators and 
their staffs to give top priority to communication with and service to 
rural households (or poor urban ones in primarily urban districts). 
Unfortunately many DA's and staff members (judging by rural criticisms not 
least during Presidential visits) view their primary duties as filing 
reports and telling (ordering) people to do what the DA believes (not 
always correctly) Maputo and/or the Provincial capital wants them to do. 
Many are averse to involving themselves in the hard work of helping the 
people and technical service providing personnel to develop the districts. 
Furthermore in some - not all - districts rural households do say they view 
administrators as outsiders interested only in their own welfare. That 
this criticism can be made of rural administrators in almost all countries 
and that in part the pattern has been caused by war (and the absence of any 
historic model of rural administration to copy except the very 
unsatisfactory Portuguese colonial one) do not reduce the need for change 
if the PDP is to work.
Land security means, to poor rural households, stable use rights over 
enough land of good enough quality to produce a decent livelihood. It may 
or may not mean any widespread desire to own the land in the Western 
individual, saleable, freehold tenure sense. It usually does mean a desire 
that use rights can be inherited. In Mozambique there is, in general, 
enough land for this goal to be met - especially if some empressa and state 
run/peasant farmed scheme land is to be redistributed to the sector 
familial. However, there are exceptions. Some peri urban areas are - as 
the result of war - hopelessly overcrowded. War moved households in these 
areas can have land security only if they can be helped to move back either 
to their home areas (probably their normal preference) or - if that is 
impracticable - to other areas with adequate land. Similarly in peri urban 
zonas verdes and limited zones of high quality land (some river margins in
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otherwise dry areas) there is not enough land for sector familial land 
security and freedom of access for private plus plantation use. In such 
cases land security means giving the sector familial priority (e.g. in the 
Ville de Tete Zona Verde where the issue has arisen).
Communal land use and communal villages may or may not be consistent with
land security as seen by the majority of sector familial households and 
rural attitudes to them probably vary widely. In general only if a broad 
pre-establishment support base exists (or communal production is one option 
and household another one without discrimination in support and service 
access provision against those who choose the latter) will communal 
initiatives be perceived by rural households as consistent with land (and 
social) security). Further, if large scale social (work team) production 
has not been practiced there are grave reasons to doubt grouped or combined 
units using existing methods will, in practice, raise output in more than a 
minority of cases. (Ex-employees of larger units - especially if allocated
the same area and producing the same products - may be exceptions.)
Villagisation in the social and residential sense, if properly explained 
and supported by provision of better water, health, education, commercial­
isation and communication/transport access to villages, will frequently be 
popular and objections will not turn primarily on land security. However,
compulsory villagisation in Tanzania, although decided on after a
democratic process and with a sector familial majority in the Party
Congress taking the decision (largely, but not wholly, because of serious
communication and implementation debacles at Regional and District 
political and administrative levels), was strongly opposed at the outset by 
perhaps 25% of rural households. This was the case even though access to 
education, health, water and communication were in fact improved. 15 years 
later support is much broader - the villages remain and there is in reality 
no barrier to people leaving them, so their survival is evidence of broad 
acceptance.
Given both the limited capacity of Districts to communicate and to 
implement and of the state to provide resources, the PDP should not make 
compulsory villagisation a priority nor seek as a uniform priority to 
encourage rapid villagisation. However, it should locate services in 
clusters which encourage village development and in the cases of internal 
or external returnados seek to achieve settlement patterns focussing on -
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say - 100 to 500 household villages. On land use tenure the principles 
should be security of tenure to the user and priority to the sector 
familial in allocating scarce land. Communal production - both for 
technical and historic bad experience reasons - should not be a PDP 
priority. That is not advice to decline to support voluntary cooperative 
agricultural or non-agricultural commercial or production initiatives. It 
does include not seeking to prefabricate a co-op structure without prior 
rural households demands for and, at least as crucial, capacity to operate 
one. Furthermore, rigid rules as to what constitutes a co-op, however well 
intended, are often rather unhelpful. Genuine cooperation on selected 
areas by several farmers or part-time artisans (e.g. women gardeners in 
Zonas Verdes or garment makers) may well merit support if they appear to be 
viable and potentially stable even if their forms are neither traditional 
nor standard co-op in nature.
Security from exploitation (or security of fair returns) implies price, fee 
and tax policies, which are broadly perceived as fair. This does not mean 
no profits for traders and transporters, but it does mean household terms 
of trade which are seen as providing a fair days work earns a fair reward 
and that a fair year's work provides a decent household income.
Nor does it mean no user fees and service charges but it does forbid ones, 
which - as operated - effectively deny access to large numbers of poor 
households. (In some districts the present rural health consultation and 
drug fees are seen as fair but in others - with much lower cash incomes - 
they are perceived as unfair and exclusionary.) Nor are taxes as such 
viewed as unfair - at least not if services including security are being 
provided. However, for historic reasons, high crop or poll taxes are 
likely to be seen as exploitation and should be avoided in favour of 
indirect taxes on urban goods purchased by rural household. For example, 
sky high taxes on beer and cigarettes are, if anything, popular in rural 
Tanzania but objectively less burdensome local level crop levies are, with 
few exceptions, grossly unpopular and often deeply resented. They also 
have substantial potential for distorting patterns of commercialisation 
either to more distant lower levy markets or to non-transparent parallel 
systems. From a purely revenue administration point of view they are high 
personnel and cash cost to revenue ratio sources whereas indirect taxes 
have much better ratios. And, in terms of incidence, levies are 
unpredictable as to progressivity whereas - especially in rural areas and
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for farming households - sales taxes exempting unprocessed food and 
artisanal goods are unambiguously progressive for up to 90% of households.
Survival Security
Survival safety nets relate primarily to access to food, to ability to stay 
on the land, to access to medical services and to avoidance of crushing 
debt overhangs. These are crucial for survival in crises situation 
priorities. They can in part be met at household level (e.g. food reserves 
and cash reserves). But for absolutely poor households emerging from a war 
context, household resources and reserve building capacity are very low and 
for the 50% of rural Mozambican households who are destitute (deslocados, 
affectados, returnados, amnestados, newly liberated area residents) present 
capacity to provide them is basically nil. Therefore, concentration in the 
PDP must be on the public sector provision with improved household storage 
at this point relating more to normal year food self sufficiency 
enhancement (by reducing losses or forced sales at harvest time to avert 
them) not intra - year reserve holding.
Food security requires that food be physically available and affordable.
In deslocado camps that does mean free ration distribution. Generally it 
is more complex. The PDP should seek to increase local purchases and fair 
(not subsidised) price commercial network sales reducing dependence on food 
aid and food handouts and helping rebuild the commercial network. To do 
that, it needs to use its rural works programme to augment rural household 
incomes seasonally, for very low income households and during crises (e.g. 
drought, flood) periods and their aftermath to the next sound harvest. 
Whether the work is paid in food, in cash or in a combination depends on 
local and national contexts (especially whether the rural commercial 
network has food to sell) and (unfortunately) on donor preferences since 
many have a bias toward paying in food not meticais to buy it. In the case 
of destitute households free food is needed until the household can re­
establish its production base i.e. 6 to 15 months if the first harvest is 
sound and 18 to 27 if it is drought (or flood or insect) ravaged.
Nominally employment on rural works could always substitute for free food. 
However, because such households have non-food cash needs and the labour 
demands of reconstructing their own homes and firms, because an infinite 
volume of rural works cannot be undertaken by reason of design, 
supervision, and skilled labour and material input constraints and because
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the initial rural commercial network capacity is low, in this case free 
food distribution appears preferable.
Ability to stay on the land is separable from food security for survival. 
(It also has a physical security aspect treated above under security.) If 
food is available but only in towns or at camps, households must leave 
their farms. The social and economic cost of such forced moves (including 
loss of life) are high and relocation problems inevitably delay post­
drought household rehabilitation bases. In a peace time context large 
scale migration to relief food is evidence of inadequate food security 
programming. In the PDP this means ensuring that free food, commercial 
food supplies and rural works employment are where the people are not 
scores of kilometres away. This does give an additional priority to 
restoring rural transport infrastructure and vehicle fleets.
Access to medical services is needed to avert crisis caused by deaths e.g. 
epidemics and common, simply curable life threatening conditions requires 
availability of vaccination capacity, some simple techniques/supplies (e.g. 
for oral rehydration) and - in some contexts - certain specialised drugs 
(e.g. snake bite serum). APE's (community based auxiliary health workers) 
and dispensaries plus backup, mobile crisis services (e.g. for 
vaccinations) are needed for this security; access to full Primary Health 
Care (postos, cnetros and mother/child clinics) probably is not an 
immediate necessity as opposed to a high 3 year priority. PDP programming 
on health and especially APE's and enhanced mobility of District level 
medical personnel are directly relevant.
Averting crushing debt burdens leading to loss of livelihood is a future 
more than a present problem in rural Mozambique. For PDP it means avoiding 
commercial network exploitation via high interest pre-harvest loans and low 
post harvest repayment in kind and including de facto crop insurance 
provisions in familial sector credit i.e. in a poor harvest year interest 
on input loans is waived and repayment rescheduled over the next 2 to 3 
years and in a no harvest year principal is also waived.
Livelihood Building
Access to a decent livelihood for the sector familial means primarily 
ability to produce for household use and for sale. Secondarily (in varying 
degrees of importance) it includes access to wage employment for some
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household members. It comprises security because without ability to go 
about ones daily work in safety from violence and arbitrary interference 
there can be no ability to earn a decent livelihood. Similarly secure land 
use rights are basic to ability to produce. Further it comprises the 
existence of survival safety nets - one cannot earn a decent livelihood if 
one is no longer alive (and one death can devastate a whole household's 
economy). However, it goes beyond these necessary, but not sufficient, 
elements.
Livelihood Restoration/Strengthening
Livelihood falls into two analytically separate (from a sector familial 
household as well as a social scientist's perspective) but inter-related 
components:
a. household production of food, housing and fuel for own use (plus local, 
de facto barter exchange);
b. cash income (from sale of crops, fish, livestock, forest produce, 
processed foods and artisanal products or services and also from 
employment incomes of family members who may or may not be resident in 
the rural household i.e. it may and historically often has included 
remittances).
The mix of these components varies widely. In much of Southern and Central 
Mozambique remittance incomes from household members working in South 
Africa, on plantations or in Lorenco Marques (as it then was) and Beira has 
traditionally been crucial to rural household economies. To a lesser 
extent (and ending in the 1960's rather than eroding in the late 1970's and 
1980's as is the case with the plantation and South African labour 
remittances) a substantial number of Northern Mozambican household 
economies were crucially dependent on remittances earned on Tanganyika (as 
it then was) sisal plantations and in domestic service (particularly as 
watchmen).
Similarly the nature of cash crops varied - in the South sector familial 
production for sale was predominantly food for the Maputo market; in Tete 
food for Beira; in the central coastal provinces cashew and cotton; in 
the North (where cash sales were lower) food for Beira (via the ports of 
Pemba and Praia and/or the Lichinga tramway line). The extent of artisanal
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and processed food production is unclear. (Fuel and pole wood and charcoal 
were not insignificant but are perhaps better lumped with crops as is 
artisanal fishing). If there are Portuguese records on this they do not 
appear to have been studied systematically (a possible priority topic for 
Institute of African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University). And one 
fairly significant product - local beer and spirits - was illegal or at 
least alegal so that hard data presumably do not exist.
Given the low level of education of any kind and low rural cash incomes it 
is probable that masonry, carpentry, tool making, blacksmithing, well 
digging, furniture making, vehicle repair, tailoring and other artisanal 
services were limited in extent and volume and, probably, largely within 
the household (i.e. clothes making, construction, etc. by household members 
for household use). Part time, seasonal wage employment by sector familial 
household members primarily engaged in agriculture does not seem - on known 
data - to have been common in the past (either absolutely or by comparison 
with other African countries such as Malawi and Tanzania where for a 
significant number of households it accounts for - say - 25% of cash and 
kind household income). Its development (partly but not only by seasonal, 
labour intensive rural infrastructure rehabilitation and development) 
should be a PDP priority.
Multiple Budgets and Gender Roles
In speaking of household livelihood it is necessary to avoid the European 
social science assumption of single household budgets either on the income 
or expenditure side and also to recognise that intra household but inter 
budget labour input obligations (e.g. wife to weeding crops for sale by 
husband; husband to clearing and sometimes ploughing land for wife to 
raise household food and marginal sale crops) are often significant.
In most African sector familial households there were and are at least two 
budgets - male head of household and wife. The former includes wage (and 
remittance) income, artisanal income of the man and sale of "man's" (i.e. 
produced primarily for sale) crops - large livestock - fish - main forest 
products. From it are paid the man's personal expenses (clothing, tobacco, 
etc), housebuilding and major repair cash costs, most farming inputs, some 
'gifts' (semi-obligatory) to wife or wives and children (e.g. cloth, 
sometimes certain purchased foods), usually (but not always) school fees 
and less uniformly medical (including transport) costs. The woman's budget
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includes food, fuel produced for household use plus marginal cash sales of 
those crops, small stock (especially chicken, eggs) and livestock byproduct 
(e.g. milk) sales, processed food and other female artisanal products. The 
expenditure (cash and kind) obligations are household food and supplies, 
fuel, women's and children's medical costs and some school fees. 
Complexities doubtless arise in the case of polygamous households.
Virtually the only single budget cases are likely to be female headed 
households and more specifically these without a male member providing 
regular remittances. Like all sketches this is oversimplified because 
budgetary patterns are not identical among regions or cultural groups nor 
static over time. (Again research by the Centre for African Studies would 
seem a priority.) What is clear is that the impact of added incomes, costs 
and labour requirements cannot be understood adequately without regard to 
gender divisions of labour and of income, expenditure and time budgets.
The PDP needs to take gender issues on divisions of labour, of income and 
of expenditure into account because adequate livelihood requires balance of 
each time and income/expenditure budget. Surpluses on one are not 
automatically transferred to meet deficits on the other e.g. more male cash 
income may not significantly improve nutrition if food for the household is 
a women's obligation and neither inputs nor time saving techniques (whether 
in food production, preservation or preparation or in fuelling, watering, 
health improvement) are made accessible to women. Similarly because cash 
is needed and the potential for getting it from agricultural sales is 
frequently low (especially for initially destitute households or in 
physically isolated areas) both labour intensive, seasonal (at low 
agricultural work periods) infrastructure employment and facilitating 
expansion of artisanal activity are needed. And both should pay specific 
attention to women's cash incomes as their budgets also have outgoings 
requiring cash (not least for tools, seeds, other inputs to produce crops 
or small stock and fowl for household nutrition).
Own food - housing - fuel production is likely to account for 60 to 75% of 
the total income of a poor but not absolutely poor sector familial 
household. (Converting own use production to cash at small town retail 
prices i.e. what it would cost to buy.) That assumes a combined set of 
household budgets made up:
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Item Total Own
Production
Food
Shelter
Artisanal Products 
Consumer Manufactures 
Seed/Tools etc 
Fees
Transport etc 
Fuel
5
5
40-55
8- 10
4-5
4
4
7 7
Total 100 60-75
The cash 40% of household income of the less poor, less war affected 
households probably varies widely as to makeup both by district and by 
household. At a guess nationally it might be 175% agriculture-fishery- 
forestry sales, 21|% artisanal sales 2 \% local wages, 2 \% intra - 
Mozambican remittances, 15% remittances (official or parallel) from RSA.
That sketch demonstrates that PDP must pay direct attention to facilitating 
sector familial household ability to produce food, building materials and 
fuel. Especially because household budget divisions mean crop sale money 
may not be available to pay for inputs into own use production, at least 
initially (and especially for destitute households) free distribution of 
basic inputs is desirable. These include:
a. seeds, core animals (to being herd rebuilding) and seedlings (e.g. 
fruit and fuel trees);
b. hand tools for farming, for fishing (including shovels, pickaxes for 
pond building) and for artisanal forestry;
c. basic household equipment (bucket, utensils for cooking/eating).
Together with these should go competent advice and education by extension 
officers which is district (or ecological zone) specific; provided largely 
through demonstrations at frequent intervals (just before the technique 
needs to be used) and to those who will do the work (predominantly women 
for many - but not all - of the tasks in own use production). In the case 
of livestock, core stock (including chicken) need to be provided to restore 
the wiped out livestock capital base and basic veterinary drugs 
(preventative e.g. vaccination against anthrax, dipping against East Coast
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fever and curative e.g. salt and other basic oral rehydration drugs against 
animal diarrhoea following the rains ending droughts).
Cash (i.e. intended to be marketed) agricultural production requirements 
for inputs and services are broadly similar to own use. However, the 
appropriate audiences may vary (e.g. in more activities men do most of the 
work). Further, because the crops or livestock or fish or forest products, 
are sold and the proceeds go to the grower's budget, more pruchased inputs 
are possible. A one to two year free starter pack (analogous to Zimbabwe 
cotton seed plus fertiliser free packets in early small farm cotton 
development) is appropriate but, thereafter, sale via the rehabilitated 
rural commercial network with flexible fair price limits on charges would 
appear desirable. That is especially true if some public sector and co-op 
shops exist to "keep prices honest". Note, however, that prices will sky­
rocket unless supplies are adequate to meet basic input requirements. For 
certain crops - e.g. cotton, cashew - specialised authorities are the 
presumptive input and extension service providers but Rural Development 
should coordinate their parts of input-extension as well as providing- 
coordinating general crop, veterinary artisanal fishery (sea, river, pond) 
and artisanal forestry (including planting and processing) extension and 
input supply.
Including Non-Aqricultural Employment
Other (i.e. non-agricultural) cash income development is a PDP priority but 
is likely to be one which varies widely by district. A uniform component 
should be seasonal infrastructure rehabilitation and development employment 
of one to three months per household with preference to destitute and 
female headed households and a minimum (say 33%) of jobs to go to women. 
There is a body of Botswana and India experience on this at macro (Indian 
states have populations larger than Mozambique's) level and several 
projects in Mozambique to use in design. WFP would probably be interested 
in at least the rehabilitation of deslocado-affectado-returnado aspects and 
ILO plus IFAD more generally. The World Bank is now cautiously favourable 
to well designed programmes of this kind. UNICEF and UNIFEM are certainly 
supportive and could be used as catalysts and perhaps pilot programme 
organisers, but neither has the in house personnel and experience to do 
overall design or monitoring except in a cluster with ILO-WFP-IFAD or by 
hiring specialised consultants.
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How much employment can be promoted in rural areas is unclear. (Raising 
opportunities for one family member to work in a city or on a corporate 
farm and send back remittances falls outside the PDP's scope. (i.e. Cidade 
do Maputo is not a PD. The Carbomac coal mine is not a PDP concern but a 
national one, even though Moatise district is a PD, because the 
considerations of what to do at Carbomac are necessarily primarily national 
and actions to rehabilitate/expand it require specialised knowledge and 
resource mobilisation/infrastructure creation very far removed from PDP's.)
Artisanal sales can certainly be increased - to varying degrees. In part 
this will be self generating as demand (sector familial cash income) rises. 
But PDP inputs may be appropriate e.g. extension/adult education; 
assistance to co-op formation (where SF artisans want it) for input 
purchase, output sale and - less frequently? - production; ensuring input 
and tool supply at fair prices (perhaps with initial small, soft loans for 
tools and basic input inventory). What inputs for what crafts is likely to 
be district specific with studies needed in year 1 and action from year 2. 
However, there are exceptions where action in year 1 should be possible. 
NGO's and UNICEF have experience of cases in which by supplying (selling) 
raw materials they immediately generated not inconsiderable net cash 
incomes (especially for women in garment making) and districts should be 
alert to locating and acting on such opportunities.
Basic Human and Production Services
Access to basic services is a SF need and priority goal as perceived by 
rural households. This cluster comprises economic services as well as 
human/social ones and marketed plus community financed as well as 
Central/Provincial budget ones. The concern is that the services be there 
and financially as well as physically accessible.
If there is to be universal access that means either no charge for basic 
human services or simple, point of service waivers of charges for - say - 
25% who are so poor they cannot afford them. In present rural conditions 
no charge may be better because absolute poverty and inability to pay must 
be 75%-90% in many rural districts when deslocados, affectados, returnados, 
amnestados and newly liberated households are taken into account. It is 
possible to exempt these categories and make allowance for 25% of other 
users to be exempted individually but that seems a misallocation of scarce 
personnel for very little money unless collection is on a community support
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buildup basis with fees payable in cash, food, building materials or labour 
and staying with the primary service unit. The revised APE (community 
health worker) agreement with World Bank is on these lines - perhaps 3% of 
cost recovered from community and payment in cash or kind worked out 
between community and the primary service unit which then keeps the income. 
This is apparently a first in a government programme receiving World Bank 
funding. Christian, Muslim and NGO medical and education cases certainly 
do exist and work moderately well, but these are not directly comparable 
with state programmes. Thus it may be prudent to see how it works before 
generalising it everywhere for all services until a workable rural hospital 
model and experience in operating it have been proven in practice.
Human services comprise primary health (APE-posto-centro-rural hospital), 
primary and adult education, pure drinking water. PDP needs to have worked 
out components for each district programme aimed (for 3 years) at restoring 
past highest levels (usually in 1981-1984 period) and drawing up 
perspectives for - say - 95% PHC and APE, 80% primary education together 
with + 65% adult literacy and 60% access to pure water by 2000. This needs 
to be done by the relevant ministries but in a PDP coordinated frame.
Health has a strategy and first steps; Education has seen the need for one 
(at least at primary level) but is just beginning to consider what that 
will require; Water has a number of projects and pieces but not (it seems) 
an overall strategic or medium term perspective (at least for rural areas). 
The previous paragraph applies directly to "cost recovery" in these 
services. There is more room for community inputs of labour, materials and 
perhaps cash into water (especially where there is an absolute shortage of 
any nearby water as well as pollution problems with current sources). But 
how much and in what form needs to be worked out district by district by 
Water in dialogue with GD's and village councils - it will not be uniform.
In exploring community based service support schemes - and even more in 
setting fees - it is crucial to look at total contribution levels proposed, 
not to treat each service in isolation. All of the costs (in time, 
material, food or money) come from the same, predominantly poor, 
households, even if the recipients service providing institutions have 
separate budgets. This may appear so self-evident as not to require 
mention but because fee and contribution proposals usually are devised and 
put forward independently by would-be recipient institutions it is a caveat 
often ignored in practice.
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Extension services should be broadened from crops, livestock, fishery, 
forestry (assuming all of these now exist at least in principle) to 
encompass artisanal skills (e.g. building, blacksmithing, tool making, 
tailoring, furniture making, charcoal, water facility maintenance, vehicle 
and equipment repair, food processing) plus humanly, socially - and by time 
saving economically - key topics (e.g. environmental sanitation, water 
source protection, nutrition). This cannot be done overnight and needs to 
be a joint operating ministry - adult education - community programme (e.g. 
APE) effort. (There is some experience in Tanzania and by UNICEF.)
Commercial Service Provision
Commercial services are no less basic, no less crucial and no less 
desired/needed by the sector familial because they are sold. The 
Portuguese colonial rural merchanting system was racist and grossly 
exploitative. But it did provide inputs, credit (however usurious) and 
"incentive" (i.e. desired consumer) goods to the sector familial.
Therefore, its collapse (literally flight) and the failure of Agricon ever 
to achieve a comparable replacement was a tragedy for millions of 
Mozambicans. PDP must give priority to reversing that tragedy (evidently 
without reintroducing racism and with guards against gross exploitation). 
The vacuum left by the rural commercial sector disappearance is the main 
reason that even in 1979-81 sector familial cash sales were (nationally and 
in most - not all - districts) sharply below 1971-73. Until that gap is 
addressed neither urban food security from domestic sources, input supplies 
for agro-industries (including textiles), demand reflation for urban 
manufactures nor rural cash livelihood problems can be overcome.
The issue is not public versus private in any ideological sense. The 
public sector is not likely to provide flexible, efficient, small scale, 
multi product commercial services. Still less can the personnel as well as 
finance constrained Mozambican empressa sector be expected to do so. And 
as Oscar Lange - one of the pioneers in articulating market oriented 
socialism - pointed out, the small trader, independent artisan and large 
family farmer do not determine the mode of production and cannot (indeed 
will have little reason to) undermine an otherwise economically viable and 
humanly caring socialist, mixed or transitional political economy. This 
was also Chao en Lai's position and the periods in which it prevailed in 
the People's Republic of China appear to have shown more rapid basic
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services advances and poverty reduction as well as higher growth rates than 
the others including the present one.
There is a strong case for multi channelism i.e. a public sector presence 
especially at wholesale level; gradual buildup of co-op (or village) 
enterprises as perceived demand for and capacity to operate them rises; 
some "fair price" monitoring analogous to that of the
abasticimento/Commercio food network of private retailers and co-ops for 
limited ranges of basic inputs and consumer goods; a large small to medium 
size private retail, sub-wholesale and up to provincial level wholesale 
enterprise component (including buying, storing, transporting and selling). 
For the PDP the priority is rehabilitation of the private sector (including 
the "fair price" safeguards). That is because this is the biggest gap and 
the area in which - except for a shelved Commercio study which should be 
found, dusted, modified and put to use - there has been the least 
articulated thinking.
Private capitalist traders will not appear simply because they are allowed 
to do so and welcomed verbally when (if) they do. They need access to:
a. shops and godowns;
b. an initial stock of goods to sell;
c. reliable flows of goods to sell;
d. buyers (including Agricon) for what they buy;
e. a reasonably dependable and gradually growing amount to be bought 
(because their turnover on the sales side depends on their providing 
cash by buying);
f. transport (i.e. vehicles and repair capacity plus usable roads and 
bridges/culverts).
PDP needs to articulate how these can be supplied. One component is credit 
(for inventories of goods for sale and goods purchased, for restoring 
premises and godowns, for buying or rehabilitating vehicles). In respect
to vehicles who bears war risks is a related issue - the one or two lorry
fledgling or reviving enterprise cannot afford to do so. Another is 
Commercio/Empressa priority in supply of inputs and basic consumer goods at
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the right time (i.e. tools, seeds and fertiliser are time specific for 
planting and cultivation seasons and basic consumer goods are most needed 
and saleable at harvest time). The Agricultural Fondos and the external 
donors/lenders who want the private sector strengthened are the logical 
sources of credit (especially as this sidesteps IMF bank lending ceilings 
albeit the Commercial Bank/Banco do Mocambique might handle loans as an 
agent). The goods supply strategy needs to be coordinated with and 
operated by Commercio and its Empressas (as does vehicle and spares 
supply). The infrastructure rehabilitation and the agricultural supply 
(for the traders to buy) aspects relate primarily to Works and Rural 
Development activity.
Small scale and artisanal goods and services businesses are analogous to 
commerce proper. Here particular attention needs to be given to avoiding 
exclusion of women e.g. women and women's co-ops should be favoured not 
excluded from garment making and food processing input and tool supplying 
and credit. As with commerce that a service is vital or at least important 
does not necessarily mean that the state is the best channel for providing 
it, nor that even where it should be a provider for poor households it 
should also produce it. (This is illustrated by the funeral business.)
The need for a decent funeral is basic in many cultures including most 
Mozambican ones. Whether - outside non Muslims in urban areas - a decent 
funeral really is perceived as requiring a coffin is less clear 
(traditionally it did not). Assuming it does, there is no clear case for 
the state providing free coffins on demand. It is a service which arguably 
should be available in main urban areas to absolutely poor households and 
(deceased) isolated individuals with no available families. Even in these 
cases there is no reason the state should remain the major coffin maker as 
opposed to buying from carpentry artisans or small workshops. This example 
is probably not a PDP concern. State coffin provision never reached rural 
areas. However, the principles it illustrates are relevant to PDP and the 
related morgue project proposals in district towns, however meritorious on 
other grounds, are not among its more evident priorities.
Infrastructure Rehabilitation
Infrastructure (beyond that for specific services) is also a basic need as 
perceived by the sector familial. Because water supply, schools, clinics, 
shops, godowns and vehicles have been covered above the dominant component
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is transport works and the second - where relevant - is infrastructure for 
small scale (i.e. SF used) irrigation. Roads, culverts, "boxes", bridges, 
ditches, drainage pipes like security tend to be underrated - until their 
absence when once they were present underlines their importance. They - 
plus the other construction needs for services - can be used to build up SF 
employment/cash income opportunities, in addition to, and consistent with, 
their primary purpose of restoring infrastructure. Both roles are integral 
to PDP's integrating "Emergencia" into, 1Rehabilitacao1 and 1Developmento' 
so that one rural strategy and one coordinated approach for each District 
emerge. That is also needed if rehabilitation and development are to be 
Mozambican (not donor) driven even though of necessity they will remain 
donor fuelled (financed) for a period well beyond three years.
Toward Strengthening Concepts and Perspectives
In conclusion several points need making:
a. the wording above is not what would be used by a sector familial 
household;
b. the ordering and analysis seeks to generalise beyond the limits the 
contexts in which they live impose on any one poor rural household or 
community;
c. the knowledge base used is fragmentary and much is from Botswana, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Ethiopia and Ghana not Mozambique;
d. thus while genuinely seeking to formulate poor rural household needs 
and priorities as perceived by them in a way usable at macro and 
sectoral strategic programming level, this presentation is largely from 
outside the Mozambican sector familial and is based on inadequate data. 
Its justification is that it is essential to make a start and to do so 
quickly;
e. therefore pre-adoption discussion of PDP at District Level with SF 
members (representatives) as well as District Administrators and 
technicians is important and building in an ongoing monitoring 
mechanism with direct SF inputs even more important;
f. and research on a number of issues (including those specifically cited 
above) would be highly useful and would appear to be a priority for the
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University and especially the Centre for African Studies as well as - 
at a quicker, simpler, more short term application oriented level - 
within Ministry, national and provincial planning units.
A Programmatic Check List For A District
Each District Programme should be tailored to that district in its 
specifics. At the same time there should be a standard set of programme 
areas for each district serving as a check list and a first approximation 
for articulating the specific plan for any particular district.
Data and empirical targets should be set up on the basis:
a. what is present situation
b. what were past peak levels
i. SF and other output - usually 70/72
ii. services (public) - usually 80/82
c. what resources needed to restore "b" (or alternative 3 year target)
i. capital budget
ii. recurrent budget
iii. personnel
iv. community mobilised (labour, materials, cash)
d. Present resources used;
e. Resources needing to be shifted in use (e.g. from large scale 
irrigation or empressa support to extension or input supply to SF and 
Emergencia survival feeding to Rehabilitacao input supply and food 
until harvest plus rural works/employment;
f. Additional resources (physical and financial to be mobilised). How to 
do so needs to be constructed (and done!) nationally not District by 
District except for community inputs which initially can rarely exceed 
2|% to 5% of total resources in cash terms.
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(Resources in each case should be specified by quantity in real terms 
as well as by cost i.e. number of lorries or spares as well as cif 
price plus freight cost.)
1970/72 is used as a first approximation target for outputs and most 
infrastructure, because it was the peak period. 1980/82 for public 
services is chosen for the same reason. The levels of output to be 
regained are those of the SF and related enterprises and overall output 
levels where possible. That means higher SF - and where viable ones exist 
empressa - output to offset lower private commercial farm and plantation. 
For output, 1970/72 levels are not always restorable in three years. The 
bottom line is substantial growth in SF output and income on a trend to 
surpass 1970/72 SF output and sales and approach 1970/72 total output and 
sales within a finite period after the first three years.
Formally the PDP is for 3 years. In practice just as Emergencia-I 
(Survival) should be transformed into Emergencia-II (Rehabilitacao) so PDP 
should move on to PDP-2 i.e. a second 3 to 5 year programme package for 
districts which have completed the initial PDP. e.g. in phasing it might 
run:
PDP-I PDP-11 Total (New Entrants)
1990/91 6 - 6 (6)
1991/92 21 - 21 (15)
1992/93 40 - 40 (19)
1993/94 50 10 60 (20)
1994/95 55 25 80 (20)
1995/96 60 40 100 (20)
1996/97 55 60 115 (15)
1997/98 50 80 130 (15)
Similarly not all PDP programmes discussed below can be instituted in each 
District during its first PDP year and each should be built up steadily 
once begun.
PDP is a coordinated (by Planning and Rural Development) multi ministerial 
and enterprise effort not a parallel government Authority approach. 
Coordination is needed at all levels from a PDP Commission (e.g. Minister 
of Planning chairing senior officials from Ministries analogous to SDA 
Commission) through District (e.g. District Administrators Chairing 
ministerial officials plus Party-Women's-Youth-Peasant representatives 
body). Especially at District and Provincial levels GD's and Assemblies
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will need to be directly involved in annual pre-approval of programmes, mid 
year reviews and annual monitoring of progress (and drawing lessons for 
programme and project revision by alteration, addition and subtraction).
For adequate SF support and adequate early warning of weaknesses and gaps 
to be forthcoming to render PDP sustainable and for the dynamic begun by it 
to continue on its own (with normal state support) after the PDP years. A 
new rural development institution to be responsible for the agricultural 
component of the PDP and to coordinate with other National and Provincial 
Ministries/Directorates in respect to other programmes may, in the present 
context of Mozambique be desirable even though it further compounds the 
lack of integration within the Ministry of Agriculture.
Broad Access Programmes
The 21 items listed as Programmes (Programmes areas) hereafter could be 
called projects. Programme may be a more helpful term:
a. it stresses need to serve large numbers not just a few people;
b. as well as encompassing policies as well as physical projects;
c. each programme area (e.g. Health) in fact comprises sub-programmes 
(e.g. posto/centro rehabilitation, APE revival) each of which includes 
several projects (each posto, centro, APE unit).
This wording is without prejudice to formulating umbrella projects e.g. 
"Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Employment Project" to sell to 
'doadores'(donors). If donors prefer programmes to be called projects and 
to finance 3 year chunk by 3 year chunk (even though the Programme will 
need to be longer) that preference probably needs to be accommodated in 
presentation. But it should not be allowed to dominate Mozambican 
strategic conception or articulation of what PDP is about or how it is to 
achieve it.
A checklist of programme areas includes:
1. education
2. health
3. water
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4. roads - bridges - culverts
5. agriculture - land allocation
6. agriculture - nutrition/household use production
7. agriculture - commercialised
8. agriculture - inputs
9. agriculture - extension and research
10. agriculture - credit
11. agriculture - projects (narrowly defined)
12. agriculture - livestock/smallstock
13. agriculture - forestry/trees
14. agriculture - fishing
15. agriculture/industry - agroprocessing and artisanal
16. commercial network - buildings
17. commercial network - vehicles
18. commercial network - goods to sell
19. commercial network - working capital
20. Labour Intensive Works/Employment
21. Emergencia/Rehabilitacao 
Services
Education. Goals turn on restoration of numbers of primary schools, 
teachers, pupils and years successfully completed to 1980/82 levels plus 
parallel restoration of literacy and continuing (practical, extension 
related) adult education to 1980/82 or higher levels. Whether this can be
done fully in 3 years is a question of fact. If it cannot, 3 years at -
say - 20% annual average enrolment growth plus a projection for full 
recovery in 2 more years can be substituted. Programming this goal and
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mobilising resources (not least teachers) is an Educao responsibility but, 
in respect to adult education, content and personnel provision need to be 
formulated together with Ministries (e.g. Agriculture, Health, Works, 
Labour, as well as education) who have extension concerns directly relevant 
to adult education as a means of extending the SF knowledge and skills 
base.
Health. The goals are analogous to these of Education i.e. postos, 
centros, mother/child clinics, rural hospitals consultations, vaccinations, 
APE's. Here a strategy of re-openings (with an initial low profile 
presence in villages and mobile services from towns) exists and is partly 
operational and an APE rebuilding "project" (programme) is articulated - 
financed - about to begin. The main problem is coordination to ensure that 
Health (nationally and provincially) does include all 40 Districts in its 3 
year first tranche. The internal logic of APE rebuilding means that the 
first 40 Districts with APE's cannot be identical to PDP's 40 but what 
should be possible is that by - say - 1992/93 there are 65 APE Districts 
including 36 to 40 of the PDP ones. For both Health and Education the 
dominant cost item is not capital projects (buildings, equipment, vehicles) 
but recurrent (drugs, books, supplies, transport operation, wages and 
salaries). The latter must be built into recurrent budgets not be separate 
PDP so far as the internal Budgetary process goes but may be estimated and 
external finance mobilised for first three years recurrent (especially 
drugs, books, supplies, new personnel - e.g. APE's - wages) if this is 
expedient fiscally and saleable to donors (e.g. if it unlocks otherwise 
blocked counterpart funds). Staff training is not per se PDP, but the PDP 
Commission should satisfy itself that the Ministries (here Health and 
Education but the point is general to all Ministries) do have training 
programmes relevant and adequate in quantity of persons taught, content of 
curriculum and quality of instruction. (If not the Ministries need to 
think through how to develop them by redesigning existing training 
institutions and/or securing resources for rehabilitation and expansion. 
That is more or less in hand at Health and - probably - Education but 
perhaps less so in - say - Agricultural extension and Works).
Water (for human use and secondarily for livestock) is a rehabilitation 
exercise where substantial capacity did exist. Where it did not PDP will 
be entering into 'new development' within the first three years. Water has 
aims and a not inconsiderable programme, but because of donor driven
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projects, and a separate emergencia financial project set, it has no 
overall strategy nor any articulated medium term targets by Province or 
District tied to actual projected/medium term budgeted expenditure. PDP 
gives it a need and an opportunity to develop these. As noted above water 
is an area in which community contributions in cash and kind to 
construction and operation can and should be explored. To work they 
require user involvement in design, user committees (whether special 
purpose or part of village council work) and training of users in equipment 
protection and maintenance. Because women and girls will in fact be the 
primary collectors and maintainers, women need to be consulted, brought on 
to committees, trained in maintenance.
Infrastructure
Roads - bridges - culverts (and associated drainage ditches, "boxes" for 
crossing stream beds, in some cases air strips) are the largest single 
Works programme within PDP. The project components must be identified at 
District and coordinated at Provincial level - they cannot physically be 
checked nationally and the sheer number of items sent in would in fact 
overload and block the articulation and monitoring process at that level 
were either physical or fiscal monitoring/checking attempted centrally.
The method of district level articulation could be:
a. identify previous roads, tracks, bridges and culverts;
b. decide which ones are priority;
c. identify needs for reconstruction, rehabilitation maintenance for 
these;
d. estimate phased three year input requirements and costs.
This work must be designed to use unskilled labour, handle tools, a few 
skilled supervisors. That is a priority both to hold down costs and to 
ensure SF part time employment and income generation. Segments of main 
provincial roads require more design input but, as demonstrated by Xai Xai 
ILO/UNDP project, can also be labour intensive. Over three years Transport 
(Nationally and - especially - Provincially) should build up its Road
Directorate's capacity but to date it has no capacity below main highway
level. The PDP transport programme cannot wait for Transport to develop 
capacity. Luckily, initially DA and Works in consultation with
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GD’s/Councils can identify what transport infrastructure existed and is 
priority for restoration and Works has capacity to do design and to execute 
independent of Transport at that level.
Tertiary and quarternary port rehabilitation may have higher design input 
requirements but is basically analogous. For coastal or riverain Districts 
such port rehabilitation - including for dhows, fishing boats and small 
sail or paddle boats carrying people and/or cargo in small
numbers/quantities may be important and should be considered as a possible 
priority. For example, the available access route to Mueda District and 
its near term 20-25,000 tonnes grain surplus runs via the tertiary port of 
Praia whose capacity is probably not up to handling such and increase in 
traffic. As CFM wishes to cut back to main ports plus railways, a new 
empressa (or instituto) for most ports (excluding Maputo, Beira, Nacala, 
Quelimane and, perhaps, Inhambane and Pemba) is needed. It almost 
certainly cannot be fully self-financing for a decade.
Agriculture
Agriculture - land allocation is basically a policy and administration 
programme, but will have some physical aspects in respect to tree felling, 
bush clearing and/or drainage which are beyond sector familial household 
capabilities especially for the deslocado-affectado-returnado-amnestado- 
newly secure district cluster. The principle should be to ensure that each 
sector familial household has secure rights of use over enough land for a 
home, a home garden, staple own use food production, livestock where mixed 
or pastoral farming is important and crops (including tree products) to be 
sold which is adequate to ensure a decent livelihood. How much (1.5 ha to 
5 ha excluding grazing seems the likely range) depends on crops and land 
quality. For settled families the first step is to check whether land 
already allocated is adequate. It may well be, except for present or past 
affectados/deslocados huddled for security reasons around towns on | to i 
hectare. The main work is likely to relate to allocating land use rights 
to resettling affectado, deslocado, returnado and amnestado households and 
the minority of settled sector familial households who have too little 
land. This is the first priority - land allocation to private commercial 
farmers, corporate farms/plantations and in the rare cases of their 
expansion empressas come after SF needs are met. There is a potential 
conflict in the case of return of intervened land to former owners - e.g.
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coconut areas in Inhambane. If such returns do displace SF households 
enabling them to re-establish in the same area is crucial to them 
economically and to their district socially and politically. However, 
except for empressas, these units should be assumed to keep existing land 
use rights. In the case of empressas hard judgements should be made on how 
much land (in some cases all of it!) is surplus to reasonable estimates of 
use within five years. That land should be reallocated to SF households 
with preference to empressa workers retrenched as part of the rectification 
exercise (an area requiring coordination with Finance).
The question of land use right allocation to women needs to be faced 
squarely. Normally one household should have one allocation - optimally in 
the joint names of husband and wife. There should be no discrimination in 
allocation against female headed households and where the woman is resident 
and the man working elsewhere, the registration should (if at all 
practicable and locally acceptable) be either in the woman's name or joint. 
This is consistent with the principle of secure land use rights for actual 
users.
As noted above, community/SF desire for communal or co-op farms is likely 
to be low and to be seen as complementing - not substituting for - family 
lands. When there are such requests, they should (subject to a rough check 
on feasibility of community or co-op actually using the land) be treated as 
second priority following SF household land allocations but taking priority 
over other sectors (e.g. private commercial). In no case should co-op or 
communal allocations be seen as a general substitute for, as opposed to a 
complement to, household allocations without the most careful checking of 
real household preferences and the economic and technical viability of the 
proposed communal enterprise.
Agriculture - nutrition and household provisioning (own use or subsistence 
crop) production has been discussed above on production and basic input 
supply sides. On nutrition, coordination among Agriculture, Health and 
Commerce is needed. Baseline estimates, however rough, on malnutrition 
(probably, given actual data available, child malnutrition) should be made 
and targets for reducing them set and monitored. This is basic to SF well 
being and food security. The primary tasks of Health - Commerce nutrition 
people are to estimate what quantities of what foods are needed to 
avoid/reduce malnutrition (at household as well as district level) and to
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carry out education/extension on use and preparation of foods. But if this 
is to work, Agriculture must provide parallel extension support and inputs 
to enable the requisite quantities of the relevant crops to be grown. It 
may be worth examining household categories to see which ones have special 
obstacles to raising household provisioning production and what can be done 
about overcoming them. More generally the point of reducing overall female 
workloads so they have more time to grow food (and, if practicable, 
providing inputs and knowledge to raise their outputs to hours used ratio) 
applies.
Agriculture - commercialised focuses on crops grown for sale (which may be 
non-food crops e.g. cotton, food crops not central to CF diets e.g. cashew 
or food crops which also figure prominently in household provisioning e.g. 
maize. Evidently (as is also true for household provisioning crops) the 
priority crops will vary from District to District in the light of 
ecological and soil conditions but also of access to processing and 
marketing facilities (e.g. if a District is to grow cotton there needs to 
be a cotton gin; therefore if cotton is to be introduced to a new district 
that District's PDP needs to include building a gin as a project). Targets 
should be set based on 1970/72 peak output, present levels and practicable 
recovery. At the least, SF output should be geared to regain 70/72 levels 
(or if very far below now to rise 20% a year on average) over 3 years. 
Similar targets for per capita production of household provisioning food 
are desirable but at present baseline data on 70/72 and especially 88/89 
production are very thin so that the estimated added food needed to reduce 
malnutrition targeting approach will at least initially, be more 
practicable.
Agriculture-Inputs comprises an ultra basic core level - seed, hand tools 
and a somewhat larger but still basic group including seedlings, livestock 
and small stock, fish lines-nets-canoes, animal drawn implements (including 
carts and draft animals plus selected agro-chemicals (fertilisers, 
insecticides, pesticides). In the case of resettled and newly liberated 
households addition of basic building tools (e.g. axes, spades) and 
household equipment (e.g. buckets, utensils) are also crucial because their 
absence will prevent or delay the re-establishment of basic household units 
and of production. In these cases - and in the aftermath of drought - food 
is a basic production input because it is necessary to enable sector 
familial labour forces to work to restore production rather than go
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elsewhere to seek alternative sources of income to avert immediate 
starvation.
PDP's seed and hand tools (plus household and building tools for those 
needing them) strategy should be complete coverage (with particular seeds 
and tools varying by District). Indeed these inputs should be provided 
(along with e.g. some health, education, water, transport infrastructure 
rehabilitation) in all reasonably secure districts, not just PDP ones. The 
problems are likely to centre on procurement and distribution more than on 
finance. In the recent past external finance available for these inputs 
has run ahead of ability to procure and distribute on a timely basis.
Early decisions (based on District estimates aggregated and - if necessary 
- revised at Provincial and National levels) on how much and what to 
procure will be key both to building up domestic production and to 
identifying and ordering from appropriate external sources. It would be 
possible at this point to use private firms as well as empressas as buyers 
but only within overall target procurement levels. Distribution faces two 
quite different problems:
a. physical capacity to get the inputs to farmers;
b. access for poor or destitute sector familial households who cannot pay.
The former is an area in which multiple channels can usefully be used at 
inter-provincial, provincial and district levels. Private rural traders 
(and co-ops) should sell inputs as well as consumer goods. But they do not 
seem easy to use for free distribution which for initially destitute 
households may be needed for up to three years. Empressas can be used to 
provincial capitals and perhaps District towns. Beyond that a mix of 
extension officers, co-ops and NGO's seems the least implausible method of 
channelling grant inputs unless the conversion of Emergencia to 
'Rehabilitacao' includes restructuring DPCCN to distribute free food (in 
this context also a production input) plus other production inputs on the 
basis of PDP targets, a direction the exact reverse of the initial 1990 
restructuring direction.
The more complex inputs - apart from Authority crops such as cotton and a 
few location specific cases - require further District level assessment as 
to priorities to avoid wasteful ordering of low or no priority items. Past 
use and commercial demand are probably adequate evidence, where
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demonstrable, to encourage wholesalers and retailers to stock some of them 
and for Veterinary to distribute drugs, dips, core stock to rebuild animal 
herds and poultry flocks. Parallels exist with respect to Forestry and 
seedlings, In some of these cases - e.g. limited numbers of chicken/chicks 
and animals and also of tree seedlings - free distribution for 1 to 3 years 
followed by commercial probably is more practicable in respect to destitute 
and near destitute rural households than charging (let alone full cost 
pricing/charging) from day 1.
Agricultural extension is itself a rehabilitation and a development area.
A checklist of challenges includes:
a. adequate numbers - ideally 1 technically qualified (certificate or 
diploma level) person per 500 households or about 25 per 100,000 person 
District plus perhaps 1 higher diploma or degree level cadre for every 
5 basic level ones;
b. building up a part time sector familial based cadre somewhat analogous 
to APE's ideally 1 per 100 households remunerated largely by provision 
of labour and/or food by their communities in return for time spent 
demonstrating new techniques/crops and/or facilitating input 
distribution (and with the added incentive that their training should 
raise their own productivity);
c. provision of transport (bicycles for base level and motor cycles for 
higher level personnel plus 1 or 2 Landrover type vehicles per 
District) so that extension workers are mobile;
d. ensuring that bodies of accurate, usable data on crops and techniques 
as well as on sector familial crop, technique, labour load and seasonal 
task patterns are 'extended' to the extension staff so they have 
something to extend. This almost certainly implies retraining most 
present extension cadres; as does
e. shifting to emphasis on demonstration (preferably backed by simple 
graphic and written materials) with a target of 4 to 5 contacts per 
farm household in groups of 10 to 20 households (about 250 day long 
demonstrations per year per basic cadre).
To pose these requirements is the first step toward Rural Development 
identifying a strategy for meeting them. Present extension service
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numbers, training, knowledge and approach are probably seriously 
inadequate. If, as data suggest, there are substantial numbers of 
agriculture and agricultural technology trained persons from 'middle 
schools' not hired (or not hired in agriculture) because of the war they 
may be the body of personnel who can best be recruited and further trained 
to increase the extension services' side. A realistic phased buildup 
should be set out for a 5 year period and projected to 10. The latter 
should assume that by year 10 (2000), extension will be made available in 
all 130 Districts.
The figures above relate to generalist crop extension personnel. They will 
need to be complemented by veterinary, forestry and fishery extension 
personnel. Numbers of these needed will be smaller and vary among 
Districts depending on the importance of animals/fowls, fishing and 
trees/bushes/products in sector familial livelihoods. For the initial PDP 
years at least, specialised single crop personnel (e.g. cotton, cashew) of 
authorities and - perhaps - separate irrigation extension personnel should 
be retained under their present employers but in the context of overall 
coordination with the other extension channels.
Agricultural research for the PDP cannot in the main be original research 
and certainly not basic research. There is an inadequate base of work in 
the pipeline and far too short a time for that. What can be done includes:
a. identifying known and field tested research results and ensuring these 
are known to extension personnel;
b. seeking to broaden the base of "a" by surveying SACCAR and neighbouring 
state research and extension results (in use by producers not just at 
research trial level);
c. conducting selective field testing on domestic research which appears 
promising as to results but has not been tested under sector familial 
conditions; similar material from "b" and selected findings on 
research applied elsewhere but not in Mozambique secured from IITA 
(Ibadan), ICRISAT, ICIPE (Nairobi) and IFAD.
The aim of the above exercise (for crops, livestock, fisheries and 
trees/silviculture) is to produce (more accurately to identify) a body of 
useful knowledge which can be extended. Over 5 years the results should
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very substantially increase the value to the sector familial of the 
extension service and may bring about substantial macro and district as 
well as household and village level production increases.
Over the same five years a national agricultural research programme needs 
to developed with clear priorities and targets and with projected resource 
(especially personnel and finance) requirements and ways to meet them. 
Specific attention should be given to using materials from and coordinating 
with the International Crops Research Institute, IFAD, African continental 
or regional institutes (e.g. ICIPE), SADCC region programming (SACCAR, 
agricultural, livestock, forestry, fishing) and national work in other 
states (especially but not only SADCC partners). If basic results 
requiring 'only' some adaptation and field testing can be secured, the lag 
between initial Mozambican work and output payoff can be reduced 
significantly. Discussions should be held with SACCAR on developing 
project design/terms of reference for such a sectoral study and the 
possibility of using SADCC's 1991 Conference as an initial step toward 
securing a financing partner or partners.
Aqriculture-Projects
The foregoing agricultural areas are basically broad front, broad access 
programmes not projects as such. They can be divided and packaged as 
projects for resource mobilising or budgeting purposes at national, 
provincial and district levels but are no more discrete projects than is - 
say - primary education or primary health care. However:
a. some items within programmes may be discrete projects e.g. a cotton gin 
in a cotton development portion of commercialised agriculture 
rehabilitation and a district infrastructure rehabilitation programme 
is necessarily composed of specific projects;
b. the irrigation sub-sector is perhaps more akin to single (large) or 
package (medium and small) project than to a programme - albeit its 
extension and maintenance aspects are programmatic rather than project 
focussed.
Irrigation is a special case because at the large, capital intensive 
project end of the spectrum too many resources are allocated to it relative 
to overall resource levels, if the PDP priority is to assist the sector
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familial as a whole to produce more and to have better access to basic 
human, economic and commercial services. Small scale, labour intensive 
irrigation schemes may well deserve more resources (absolutely and 
relatively) but both ecology and cost will prevent their being central to 
PDP's sector familial oriented strategy.
Agriculture-Processing and Agro Industry
Processing and agro-industry have variegated roles in output rehabilitation 
and development:
a. in some cases (e.g. cotton gins, tea factories), without the processing 
unit the crop is valueless because not preservable nor transportable in 
the form in which it is harvested;
b. in others (e.g. perhaps oil seed milling) rural value added and 
employment can be raised and transport costs reduced by siting 
processing units in main producing districts;
c. in the case of products used locally (e.g. household goods, crafts) 
processing and artisanal agro-industry can diversify income sources and 
raise village/district self reliance. In the case of grain and cassava 
milling they can (especially if owned and operated by women's co-ops) 
reduce overall female workloads and, at least for some women, augment 
cash income;
d. by-products of large production units - e.g. bagasse and molasses in 
the case of sugar plantations - may afford opportunities for sector 
familial production (paperboard, fuel briquets - by drying bagasse, 
rum, candy, cattle food) and for integrating plantation and sector 
familial economics (beyond the more obvious link of SF production of 
food to be sold to plantation employees).
The particular priorities for processing and agro-industry are likely to 
vary widely from district to district. Some artisanal opportunities - e.g. 
grain and cassava milling, fish smoking, charcoal making - are likely to 
exist in most cases. What - beyond extension advice - they need, e.g. in 
the way of Fondo credit and provision (for sale) of construction materials 
and simple tools/machinery, is likely to vary. The number of larger units 
- e.g. cotton gins, urban market oriented oil mills - needed is likely to 
be small (and perhaps focussed on rehabilitation).
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Agriculture (Silviculture) - trees and artisanal forestry is an area of 
considerable importance because of its implications for fuel (household use 
and commercialised) and for conservation. Mixed farming including trees 
and bushes for food, fuel, fodder, household provisioning and home 
construction and sale of fuelwood, poles for building and charcoal has 
proven a means to improve small farming household living standards under 
many conditions. (A considerable body of expertise and experience 
including printed materials exists, albeit most is Asian - especially 
Indian - not African.)
What can be done by the PDP depends on the present data base and extension 
capacity of Forestry. However, a start can be made quickly in providing 
seedlings of fast growing indigenous or localised fuel and food crop (e.g. 
citrus) trees and encouragement of household and village planting. 
Conservation use of trees (on areas at risk from erosion and lack of wind 
or water breaks) can be extended/promoted most effectively when the trees 
are economically valuable as sources of fuel, poles, fodder, food. There 
is some Tanzanian and Ethiopian experience (including some successes) in 
this area. Depending on the present state of knowledge and staff a related 
"Research and Extension Development Project" would be desirable. (As 
relevant experience includes India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and 
Tanzania the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation might be 
interested.) Similarly material on regional experience should be sought 
from the SADCC Forestry Sector unit in Lilongwe as well as - if anglophonic 
candidates are available - access to forestry training facilities (diploma 
and degree) in neighbouring states.
Agriculture-fishing is evidently particularly relevant in coastal 
Districts. However lake, river and pond artisanal fishing has historically 
been of significance and its potential importance in each District should 
be examined specifically. If, as appears to be the case, such inland 
fishing has received low attention from Fisheries, the SADCC unit (also at 
Lilongwe) and neighbouring state research and training programmes may be 
useful as sources of initial data and training capacity.
Fishing, like crops, needs inputs (e.g. lines, nets, sinkers, in some cases 
wood and metal screws/nails plus woodworking tools for canoes or other 
small fishing boats) and extension advice. Similarly processing facility 
advice may be important (quality of 'traditional1 smoking and drying
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technology is very uneven over small distances in many African states) and 
a commercial network to sell surpluses above local consumption. Dried fish 
is marketable in at least many smaller towns and provincial capitals so the 
presence of traders and suppliers to buy, not of potential customers, would 
appear to be the binding constraint over a 3 to 5 year time horizon.
Agriculture-livestock is in broad terms analogous to crops. In many 
districts cattle, goats and, less generally, pigs have played a significant 
role in commercialised production and in most goats and fowl (usually 
chicken although possibly including ducks in some cases) have been a 
significant source of household protein requirements. The war has probably 
been even more damaging to the livestock component of the sector familial 
economy than to the crop portion.
PDP District programmes should target livestock (and fowl) recovery goals 
in respect to household consumption and sale. Their relative 
importance/scale will vary, but is unlikely to be or non-needed or 
negligible in any District. While the broad input-extension-commercial 
network requirements for livestock are comparable to those for crops there 
are also significant differences. The initial capital input on the 
production side is animals/fowl to re-establish viable core herds/flocks. 
How to secure and distribute these does not appear to have attracted much 
attention to date either in Mozambique or in post-disaster (usually 
drought) livelihood rehabilitation programmes more generally. Further, 
depending on actual disease incidence and control techniques, a substantial 
number of dips and chemicals to operate them (e.g. for protection against 
East Coast Fever) are likely to need to be built or rehabilitated. 
Veterinary extension traditionally (probably appropriately) has a higher 
disease prevention and treatment component than does crop extension.
Another point is that in at least some African states where traders do 
stock tool, seeds, fertilisers they have been less willing to stock 
veterinary drugs (including chemicals for dips). Therefore, it may be 
desirable to envisage the Veterinary Service as the main distribution 
channel (charging some fee from year 2 or 3) until the interest of traders 
in carrying these items can be assessed. Again the SADCC unit (in 
Gaborone) may prove a useful data source on programmes under Southern 
African ecological and resource scarcity conditions.
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Commerce
The commercial network rehabilitation programming of PDP has four main sub­
components :
a. buildings;
b. vehicles;
c. working capital;
d. goods to sell.
These need to be backed up by the infrastructural rehabilitation noted 
above in respect to roads, bridges, culverts, etc. if the vehicles are to 
be able to move moderately expeditiously, to avoid recurrent breakdowns and 
to have plausible (to users) costs of operation and repair.
It is impossible to over stress the importance of this sector to the 
recovery of sector familial cash incomes (or to domestic provisioning of 
towns and cities). Equally crucial is recognising that at rural retail 
level small and middle sized private and cooperative enterprises are likely 
to be much more effective than large public or large private ones. It is 
that retail level which is of direct concern to the PDP in that the 
wholesale network and Agricon already exist at provincial level.
Leadership in this programme area should be the role of Commerce.
In respect to buildings - shops and warehouses - the key word is access. 
Whether the traders own or rent the premises is secondary so long as they 
exist, are in usable condition and not so high cost as to cripple the 
renter (or owner). At village level, village built and owned warehouses 
with shop rooms rented in part to several traders may be more efficient 
than numerous separate buildings. However, at that level a trader can 
probably initially use his lorry as a mobile store if facilities are not 
available so that the immediate need may be for space in which sector 
familial households can safely put goods for up to two weeks until a buyer 
arrives. Given damage and destruction of buildings, some credit mechanism 
for traders to finance buildings and/or their repair is needed - perhaps, 
as suggested above, through one of the Rural/Agricultural Fondos.
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Vehicles are even more crucial than buildings as are spare parts and 
maintenance facilities (garages). Commercio and Finance should be able to 
negotiate 'aid' supplies of vehicles and spares and - e.g. via EEC - for 
building up decentralised, private maintenance facilities. However, in 
some towns and districts garages do appear to exist and the return of many
mechanically skilled miners from the Rand suggests the skill position may
not be as bad as is sometimes supposed at least in the southern Provinces. 
The PDP's problem is in identifying and setting in operation a system 
allowing traders to buy (or rehabilitate seriously deteriorated) vehicles. 
The Maputo recreation of urban private transport is atypical and does not
indicate that most rural traders have access to own funds or credit. The
alternatives would be for the 'doadores' (especially those belligerently 
calling for a larger private sector role) to allow the vehicles provided by 
them to be sold on - say - 5 year, 20% interest hire purchase terms with 
the Banco do Mocambique/Commercial Bank serving as an agent or for credit 
to be channelled through a Rural/Agricultural Fondo and with war risk 
covered either by the donors (especially on loaned funds), the government 
institutions or jointly since small enterprises cannot cover it themselves 
and premium costs would be a major barrier to early year enterprise 
viability. In respect to spares the basic problem is not likely to be 
credit but seeing that regular supplies reach provincial capitals and 
district towns.
Commercial working capital is often misunderstood. It is not an "unreal" 
phenomenon composed solely of account book entries as often supposed in 
national plans. It consists primarily of inventories of raw materials, 
goods in process and finished products; secondarily of liquid resources to 
make purchases; tertially of spare parts and supplies. Unless a trader 
has goods to sell and cash to buy produce he cannot operate even if he does 
have a store, a warehouse and a vehicle. The two options in respect to 
goods are credit from wholesalers and from the commercial banking system 
out of its own resources or as agent for a Fondo. For the initial cash to 
buy crops, livestock, fish, forest products, etc., financial institutions 
are the only plausible source other than the merchant's own capital. 
Turnaround of payments for purchases should be fairly rapid if the rural 
trader has the right goods to sell; sector familial households will 
usually sell to him in order primarily to buy from him. Many rural 
merchants after years of low turnover and war losses do not have the funds 
to restore or re-expand their operations without credit.
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Commercial goods supply is a separate issue from working capital because 
there are physical shortages of goods - especially in the less easy to 
reach provincial capitals and secondary towns where rural traders 
(including co-ops) will procure their stocks. What Commerce can do within 
the PDP frame is to project rural commercial network requirements for - say 
- 30 to 40 basic consumer and house construction items and work out an 
allocation system through Provincial wholesalers to rural merchants. The 
EEC backed programme underwriting goods supply to cashew growers may be of 
some value as a 'model'. Because access to goods to sell is valuable to 
traders, it is likely that adherence to a requirement to sell in rural 
areas could be secured, enforced as abasticimento/commercio food price 
controls are, and largely accepted and implemented by retailers.
Labour intensive public works have been sketched above on the programmes to 
employ them. As stressed they have an equal importance in raising poor 
sector familial household incomes particularly for destitute (newly 
resettled or liberated) and female headed households and during drought 
years. To serve the second (income augmentation) purpose requires not 
merely labour intensity, but also seasonal phasing with peak employment 
potential at times other than these in which farm labour requirements are 
highest.
Ideally a target of an average of $30 per household wages (say 6 weeks at 
$5 or Mt 5,000 per week at probable 1990 average exchange rates) would be 
set. That would come to about $600,000 per district (2,400 person years) 
or $24 million a year for all 40 Districts. That may be too optimistic a 
target on two counts:
a. ability to mobilise resources;
b. ability to deploy skilled and supervisory personnel, tools, 
complementary equipment and construction inputs (albeit by year 3 of 
the PDP that constraint could surely be broken).
If that is the case a fallback target of $20 per household per year - $16 
million overall would be plausible. The per household sum is very meagre 
indeed, but for many rural households it is above total present cash
income.
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In one sense such employment will be self targeting. Households with 
reasonable cash incomes and economically profitable on farm (including land 
improvement and crop processing or artisanal production) labour 
opportunities will not seek work. However, priority should be given to 
returnado, former (resettling) affectado and deslocado, amnestado and newly 
liberated households who tend to be in the main destitute groups now and to 
female-headed households who historically, today and in the medium term 
have had/will have the lowest average cash incomes in the sector familial. 
Judging by Botswana experience the last priority may require setting a 
minimum of 35% of all person months of employment aside for women. Social 
pressures are unlikely to be so uniform or strong as to deter women coming 
forward to seek work but past habit (especially by Works) and the 
"invisibility" of women to many functionaries can lead to their being 
'overlooked' in hiring.
Finance can probably best be sought from counterpart funds (food and other) 
or cash Emergencia-II ('Rehabilitacao') pledges. Alternatively (or 
complementarily) part can come from funding for specific programmes e.g. 
Primary Health Care Facility Restoration, Rural Water, Secondary and Rural 
Road Rehabilitation. The problem with Food Aid used as wages in kind is 
that it is inappropriate if most households are at or near self 
provisioning, for households receiving direct food grants as part of a 
rehabilitacao package and more generally in Districts in which a commercial 
food sale system has been restored. These difficulties can be avoided if 
'donors' allow the physical food aid to be commercialised and the proceeds 
used to pay wages. A second best would be to pay 50% cash and 50% in not 
over 3 foods (e.g. a staple grain, vegetable oil, sugar). That method is 
used on the Inhambane Road project (albeit without the oil/sugar emphasis).
Resettlement - Reestablishment - Rehabilitation
Emergencia to Rehabilitacao transformation and integration into normal, 
mainline governmental processes is of wider coverage than PDP. However, it 
is crucial to PDP so that a series of check points for transformation can 
usefully be noted here:
a. procurement and movement of grant food aid to provincial level should 
remain primarily with DPCCN/Emergencia albeit as capacity rises 
contracts with other transporters could be explored;
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b. distribution to persons/households in camps, relocation centres etc., 
should be via Emergencia or ngo/local administration channels;
c. while rehabilitacao food grants to resettled/livelihood rehabilitated 
households could be handled either by Rural Development (extension) or 
District Administration or - perhaps - DPCCN;
d. the same applies to free tools and seeds, as well as household 
equipment at the beginning of rehabilitacao - like food they should be 
channelled to the commercial network when sold;
e. tools and seeds as well as household equipment may - if convenient - be 
mobilised from external sources by Emergencia, but as part of national 
(including PDP) targets and subject to national allocation. In fact, 
1990 experience suggests that neither UNDP nor donors prefer that 
(Emergencia) channelling;
f. while Emergencia/Rehabilitacao fund mobilisation for - e.g. - health, 
education, water may, on a decreasing basis, still be useful as certain 
'doadores' may classify emergency and rehabilitation outside (above) 
normal "country ceilings", these resources should go to the relevant 
Ministries to support these parts or units of their independently 
designed national (including PDP) programmes, which can be described as 
serving primarily deslocados, affectados, returnados. Separate 
collations of such projects outside sectoral Ministry components of the 
PDP and 3 year plan should be phased out by 1992. In the case of NGO's 
direct liaison with sectoral Ministries should be instituted even if 
they first go to Emergencia/Rehabilitacao and select their own project 
sites. This would at least allow the Ministries to have a clear 
overall picture of what is ongoing and to switch resources to Districts 
or locations left blank by the NGO's. There is doubtless a balance to 
be struck between utilising ngo creativity and initiative to complement 
main line government activity and to support the growth of their 
Mozambican civil society analogues and ensuring that there is an 
adequate degree of frame setting and coordination by Mozambique and 
Mozambicans to ensure that national and sector familial goals are 
served. At the moment there can be little doubt that there is too much 
freedom of manoeuvre (sometimes misused) for ngo's and too little 
coordination and guidance by Mozambicans (including not least 
Mozambican ngo's and sector familial);
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g. donors should if possible be convinced that in the Rehabilitacao phase 
being destitute and needing special support to achieve livelihood 
rehabilitation was the qualification for a household not a physical 
move within Mozambique or across a border. The sector familial 
households in newly secure areas in Zambesia, Niassa and Manica are in 
many cases just as destitute and have just as appalling malnutrition 
rates and loss - by bandidos' destruction - to health, education and 
water as those households who actually fled. (A related point is that 
they too should be eligible for Emergencia food-tools-seeds-utensils 
aid now as well as in Rehabilitacao. That point is taken by many NGO's 
and some UN agencies - e.g. UNICEF.)
h. therefore, Emergencia should - along with DPCCN - be on the central PDP 
Commission and DPCCN on the Provincial and District level coordinating 
committees because for certain purposes they do still remain funding 
and operating units analogous to the key ministries and departments 
(Agriculture, Planning, Finance, Health, Education, Water, Works, 
Commerce, Fisheries, Forestry, Transport, Industry, Energy, Agricon and 
- in certain District Crop Authorities - and at the national level the 
Banco do Mocambique's commercial banking section).
NGO's - treated with Emergencia because historically their upsurge is 
related to it - pose special coordination problems as well as (in some 
cases) special advantages of flexibility, speed and suitability for small 
scale operations with Mozambican communities, NGO's (e.g. church groups) or 
quasi-NGO's (e.g. Mozambican Red Cross). There are a very large number; 
they prefer to relate to specific small projects; they normally wish to be 
their own implementing agencies; they frequently phase out their support 
before sustainable community or state substitutes are in place. At best 
this is creative disorder; at worst near anarchy. But NGO's are useful, 
increasingly popular with national and international agency 'doadores', 
valuable external publicity and public support mobilisers for Mozambique 
and potentially a source of experience and support for Mozambican ngo's 
(civil society groups). A way forward might be to create a Mozambique-NGO 
Commission chaired by External Cooperation with Finance, Planning, SDA 
Commission representative, RDP representative, Emergencia as members and a 
small secretariat to keep indexes of NGO proposals/capacities/records and 
Ministerial plus Mozambican NGO or quasi NGO programme components, 
projects, partners suitable for NGO's. NGO's and partners could then be
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'introduced' to each other with a potential project agenda. Sub-commission 
meetings among sectoral Ministries and NGO's interested in that sector 
could also be useful. This approach is somewhat similar to the Community 
Development Trust in Tanzania albeit that is more narrowly focussed on 
external NGO/Tanzania NGO or community project partnerships.
V.
TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION
The PDP's formulation began in 1989. It was carried out by an inter- 
ministerial working group headed by the National Director of Rural 
Development.
The first stage of preparatory work involved baseline studies of the 
districts including existing facilities programmes and projects. These 
were carried out by Mozambican professionals.
The working group worked to articulate a national strategy and programme 
package based on the basic goals underlying the political decision to give 
priority to PDP and informed by the data in the studies and contributed by 
the working group members. Seeking to avoid past debacles when roughly 
sketched Mozambican concepts had been handed over to expatriate 
professionals and articulated but also transformed (or distorted) into 
something very different in structure and priorities from the initial 
Mozambican goals, and from Mozambigue's capacity to implement, the working 
group used quite limited amounts of foreign advice and kept programme 
write-up in Mozambican hands.
Following a favourable external cooperating (potential funding) partner 
response at the 1989 Consultative Group Meeting and an early 1990 World 
Bank pre-evaluation mission, the preparation process moved to production of 
a full draft document in March 1990.
In light of personnel shortages, donor preferences (biases) for complete 
re-runs of all analysis and proposals by their own consultants and general 
bureaucratic/negotiation inertial factors (on both Mozambican and funder 
sides) a final programme by late 1990; initial funding commitments in early 
1991; implementation beginning in mid-1991 (the start of the 1991-92 crop
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year in most of Mozambique) appears the most optimistic temporal projection 
but also one which is just attainable.
Some Criticisms and Partial Answers
The PDP document and process have been criticised as:
a. too project centred;
b. too bricks and mortar centred;
c. too dependent on foreign personnel;
d. too limited in professional input;
e. too little concerned with programmes;
f. inadequate in attention to training;
g. unrelated to and untested by consultation with the sector familial;
h. too complex and bureaucratic;
i. failing to learn from the shambles of most integrated rural development 
projects of the late 1960s through early 1980s era;
j. focused on too few districts.
Each criticism is based on an actual or potential weakness. But - 
especially in the months of expatriate agricultural experts, a community 
who have shaped the operational form of most Mozambican agricultural policy 
by monopoly control over finance and an asserted greater technical and 
knowledge competence which has never been wholly true and has not led to 
avoiding repeated, egregious technical as well as social and political 
errors11 - they appear rather overblown and often captious.
The PDP is to a large extent centred on programmes including recurrent 
budget programmes. Certainly it is far more focused on these than most 
previous rural (or other) planning in Mozambique. However, available data 
and a donor preference to have proposals packaged as projects (often 
including recurrent components)12 does both to some extent actually - and 
even more in appearance - give the impression of continued projectitis and 
a danger of implementation deviating in that direction.13
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Bricks and mortar do matter - if they are in a strategic and programmatic 
frame. How Mozambique's rural infrastructure, basic services and 
commercial network are to be rehabilitated and expanded without them is 
unclear. Further, the need for initial, cash injecting rural employment 
requires substantial public works - as well as more care in avoiding the 
traditional capital and skill intensive main-line donor/technocrat approach 
that PDP has yet worked out. Also because to get a "bankable" package on 
paper, PDP had to use what project (bricks and mortar) data were to hand a 
number of the micro-components do appear questionable.
On the face of it the complaint of over-dependence on foreign personnel 
appears to be the inverse of reality. A handful of agro programme 
technicians with field experience chosen by Mozambique could have speeded 
up articulation and improved the quality and quantity of detail - 
especially on programmes, research and data collection, training and labour 
intensive public works.
But the reasons they have not been secured and used are neither trivial nor 
fully within Mozambican control. Donors do not provide technicians quickly 
nor - usually - without detailed discussions of what they are to do. In 
the past Mozambique has rarely had a say on who was provided and has found 
its limited numbers of senior personnel facing phalanxes of technical 
assistance experts united in saying (often, but not always, more subtly) 
"Leave it to us, we know better than you". The PDP working group was 
determined to avoid massive delays and, even more, a foreign takeover and 
Mozambique had limited data and no funds to acquire 5 or 6 individuals 
quickly on its own initiative.
However, there is a danger of future expatriate dominance precisely because 
the maintenance of Mozambican control over conceptualizations and initial 
articulation has built up a back-log of analysis at middle and micro level. 
This cannot be done rapidly with present Mozambican personnel. Worse, it 
opens the way (or arguably creates the need) for funders to insist on 
providing personnel chosen by them to 'guide' final pre-implementation 
formulation and implementation.
The limits to quantity and cross country experience of professional input, 
flow from the perceived need to maintain a Mozambican driven (even if donor 
fuelled) PDP. However, there is a very real problem - how is Mozambique to 
train both more top and middle level professionals (particularly in
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analysis) and more district and field levelparaprofessionals/administ- 
rators. The initial PDP articulation identifies the problem but does not 
appear to provide adequate means or resources to address it effectively.
At district and field level this is particularly vital because, with rare 
exceptions, expatriates will not be operationally effective (especially in 
programmes and small projects) at these levels.
A similar query may relate to baseline data collection on the sector 
familial and on adoptive research. However, the former should at least 
partly be provided by the Social Dimension of Adjustment unit in Planning 
and - with a lag - by the 1992 Census which is to include a social and 
economic household survey component.
That systematic contact with the sector familial has been limited and 
formal contact with the elective bodies at District and Provincial level 
even more so is a fact. But there has been direct contact by both 
consultants and by PDP staff with sector familial households in several 
districts including openness to hearing their comments on and criticisms of 
present projects and programmes. In fact this is a very substantial step 
forward in terms of Mozambican rural planning exercises. Similarly 
Provincial and District personnel have been consulted even if not in all 
Districts or Provinces.
The structural complexity is partly inherent in Mozambique's administrative 
structure and partly in the subject matter of the PDP. A national 
strategic approach must have a national level. An approach to be close to 
the sector familial must have a District level. Given the role of 
Provinces there is a need for a Provincial level especially as the number 
of PDP districts expands.
The presence of coordinating committees at each level relates to the 
subject matter of the PDP. While the agricultural components of the PDP 
can be grouped under a single Instituto nationally and in analogous 
Provincial and District teams, the Health, Education, Water, Works and 
Commerce components should not be (and in practice could not be). PDP is 
clear on the need to avoid "parallel government".
But if at least six ministries (treating the Instituto as Agriculture) are 
to have mutually reinforcing programmes coordination on phasing, timing and 
- to some extent - content is needed at District, Provincial and National
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levels. The inclusion of Finance and of planning in these coordinating 
committees is prudent given their central role in overall strategic and 
expenditure coordination and resource allocation.
The main lessons of the old integrated rural development programme/project 
model would appear to be:
1. creating parallel multi-purpose administrative authorities parallel to 
the main governmental structure is undesirable;
2. coordination among parallel ministerial programmes in rural areas is 
unlikely to happen by itself or by osmosis;
3. expatriate (especially short stay expatriate) designed technocratic 
rural programmes tend to suffer badly both from inadequate contextual 
knowledge and avoidable technical mistakes and - even more basic - from 
failure to relate to actual social and political goals and processes;
4. frequently, while the associated programmes have been sound (and 
worked), the core agricultural content was so weak as to make 
significant output gains most unlikely (as indeed ex post analysis 
shows they were)14
PDP does not create a parallel administration, At field level it is 
perceived as part of District Administration and headed by the District 
Administrator. On the other hand it seeks by regular meetings of senior 
officials at each level to create a climate for coordinating design and 
monitoring and, by use of Provincial Planning Units and District 
Administrators, to set up the potential for enforcing it if necessary.
As noted, the PDP process to date has been dominated by Mozambicans, has 
sought to use contextual data and has been acting on political decisions as 
to what are Mozambique's strategic priorities.
Whether the agricultural core is, at this point in time, strong enough to 
enable rapid output growth is partly unclear and partly definitional. 
Adequate provision of seeds, basic tools, commercial access and transport 
can in many PDP districts allow at least 50% increases in overall and 100% 
increases in marketed output over three years.15 How much more extension 
personnel and generalisation of known, tested practices (whether from 
research or best local practice) can add is unclear and varies by District.
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But it can add something, and over three years can be built up by the time 
the input - infrastructure - commerce fuelled recovery begins to plateau. 
Whether, in fact, it will be, turns on the training and research 
problematics cited earlier.
The Year 1 limitation of PDP to 6 Districts is almost certainly unwise. It 
is a donor enforced decision - almost the only one to date with the 
possible exception of the framing of expenditures in project form. At 
political level Mozambique sought a 40 District programme, i.e. the need 
for selection to allow an adequate mass in each selected district was 
accepted but synthesized with the need to begin on a broad enough front to 
have social, political and economic impact at National and Provincial level 
as well as in the selected districts. At technical levels doubts existed 
as to whether administrative and professional/para-professional capacity 
existed to begin 40 district programmes at once or whether a lesser 
number16 should be begun in year one with all 40 programmes underway by 
year 3.
At least some key donors sought at most 4 districts for the first three 
year cycle. The compromise of a 40 district programme beginning with six 
in year one and rising to 40 in year three is probably too cautious and 
risks losing momentum, but it represents considerable Mozambican success in 
maintaining the 40 target for the third year and is hardly a Mozambican 
error of over-concentrating staff on a few islands within a sea of 
inaction.
PDP is not perfect. But it is better conceptualised, more contextualised, 
better linked to political level goals and decisions, more integrally 
Mozambique's own work17 and more likely to be broadly successful in 
attaining its targets than any previous Mozambican rural development 
strategic initiative.
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BACK TO NAMIBIA
The PDP relates only tangentially to two central aspects of Namibian 
agricultural strategy needs:
a. large production units/employment
b. ecological protection.
In respect to large production units this relates to the PDP focus. The 
general Mozambican record suggests that public sector corporate units - 
especially hi tech/hi capital intensity ones - are likely to be dead ends 
strategically and unviable as projects/enterprises outside specialised 
niches (e.g. the seed company, tea and perhaps sugar). This would appear 
to be relevant to reviewing FNDC (or successors) future priorities and 
present portfolio.
Mozambique's private commercial farm sector is now very small and 
peripheral. Namibia's is not - it is substantial and strategic.
Therefore, pushing it to the periphery of attention would be unwise.13 
Certain hypotheses may be derived from Mozambique's experience which are 
worth testing in deciding on Namibian strategy and policy.
First, if the large ranchers leave, it will be very difficult to keep the 
ranches operating effectively on their present technology and scale (let 
alone amalgamating several into one enterprise).23
Second, present ranch workers are unlikely to wish to become small scale 
ranchers or mixed farmers. They are likely to wish to remain in wage 
employment but not on ranches. Unless wages, conditions of service and 
access to basic services are radically improved they are likely to drift 
into peri-urban areas and/or relatives' urban households; creating a fairly 
evident set of problems to which no easy answers exist.
Third, the least bad way to cut (output and state budget) losses on owner 
abandoned medium and large scale units is to sell them to other experienced 
ranchers (if any are in the market) and the second least bad to turn them 
over to their present employees to reorganise either as co-ops,
'traditional' ranches or household mixed farming units - an approach
VI.
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recently adopted in Mozambique in respect to a substantial number of 
derelict units.20
The implications for Namibia would seem to include: maintaining the 
existing large ranching support services; seeking to use EEC, and other 
non-RSA markets, access to phase down subsidies (including capital grants 
and concessional interest rates); creating an atmosphere conducive to
present in-place ranchers staying and - consistent with the foregoing -
making ranch work more attractive to present employees.
The last might include: wages higher than at present but below urban 
minima; better housing, water and food; allocation of plots for fowl, small
stock and, where feasible (including by limited sized garden spot
irrigation), some crop production (by the employee and - primarily - his 
immediate households); where it has not already happened encouraging 
reunification of the employee's immediate household on the ranch; providing 
effective access to basic education and health services to ranch workers 
(possibly requiring employer provision of transport when there is no common 
carrier alternative). For this purpose, the Zimbabwean case is likely to 
be much more relevant than either the Mozambican or (except for provision 
of services) that of Botswana.
Ecological protection and rehabilitation is not a challenge which is 
comparable in Mozambique and Namibia beyond the common sense conclusions 
that overcrowding war displaced persons on tiny chunks of land is 
environmentally destructive and that the woodfuel requirements of a major 
city in a low rainfall area have a disastrous and spreading impact on 
adjacent and medium distance tree population. Mozambique has a much more 
favourable genuinely arable land/population ratio, much larger (absolutely 
and relatively) true forest/wood areas and a set of rainfall patterns which 
makes almost all of it ecologically less fragile. Botswana and Zimbabwe 
"communal area" experiences are probably more useful parallels to study.
To write out a list of concrete suggestions for Namibia from the Botswana 
experience and the PDP would be possible but probably not very useful, or 
even counter-productive for Namibian readers.
The initial list of parallels, the post-1975 Mozambique experience and the 
content (and perhaps the formulation and proposed implementation process) 
of the PDP should speak for themselves to the informed Namibian reader.
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Doubtless they may say different things in different local contexts and 
reasonable people will to some extent hear them somewhat differently. But 
hearing, dialogue on what has been heard, and incorporating the voices into 
Namibian strategy are primarily for Namibians to do.
Perhaps that last point does justify drawing one conclusion. Especially at 
conceptualization and broad articulation level the personnel involved 
should be basically Namibian and the selected uitlanders ones chosen by 
Namibia on the basis of their experience, known outlook and - preferably - 
prior knowledge of Namibia. Persons provided by agencies seeking to 
establish a policy influencing role and especially ones able to use 
financial and personnel carrots and sticks to "reinforce" their advice 
should be avoided. At latter stages technical specialists can be useful 
as, at all points, can selected persons working in the context of a 
Namibian run institution and/or work team.21 The implications for 
utilising all trained Namibians (made possible by reconciliation but also 
requiring rapid substantive involvement of the almost equal numbers who 
have returned from training abroad) and for a coherent, articulated 
training strategy may be hard to implement in detail but neither is hard to 
see nor to act on promptly in general.
iNotes
1. The PDP districts have been chosen after consultation with security
forces as districts which are now or can in the short run be made 
secure.
2. Displaced totally dependent persons exceed 12% of rural population
and displaced, seriously affected but not wholly dependent are about 
30%. External refugees (externally displaced) are about 12%.
3. Colonial Mozambique was only a marginal basic food importer
(wheat/rice). However, it also had a very high level of 'ineffective 
demand1 as evidenced by what urban and rural malnutrition data scraps 
exist.
4. Mozambique has a three tier system with very substantial
decentralisation to provincial directorates budgetarily and in policy 
detail (not broad frame and priorities) autonomous from parallel
national ministries. District autonomy is less. Each level has a
representative legislative body but Provincial Governors are 
nationally appointed as are district administrators. Provincial
Directors (unlike National) do not have Ministers but form 'cabinet'
of Governors. (Status of cities is somewhat confused statutorily and 
in practice - de facto Maputo Cidade senior directors and most 
programmes are supplied/financed by National Ministries. Not 
directly relevant PDP.)
5. This relates in part to fragmentation within Agriculture. Two crops
- cotton, cashew - are handled by virtually autonomous Institutes 
(Authorities) and two Directorates - Irrigation, Forestry - have de 
facto used donor links plus weak ministry planning/analysis/policy 
capacity to write their own tickets.
6. 1,750,000 is roughly UNPA/UNIN estimate for 1990 Namibian population. 
700,000 plus registered voters - who on known age structure can 
hardly exceed 40% of population - also suggests roughly 1,750,000. 
(That assumes eligible but non-registered persons were of the same 
order of numbers as registered South African residents and registered 
UNITA plus RSA san auxiliary unit combatant/dependents/camp followers
- perhaps 35,000 in each case.)
7. This is not a criticism of reconciliation. It is simply noting the 
fiscal cost of ensuring a climate in which needed professional, 
technical, managerial and entrepreneurial personnel would be 
relatively likely to stay or trickle out over 10-15 years. As 
contrasting Zimbabwe and Mozambique experiences suggest, that price 
may be well worth paying. This is not to state that Mozambique had 
any viable "reconciliation" option open to it after "ultra" settlers 
attempted a last minute coup against transitional Portugal-Frelimo 
government. Zimbabwe did have an option and made a choice as has 
Namibia.
8. The speed with which such a structure can adapt to serving a 
broadened set of customers should not be underestimated. Zimbabwe's 
transformation, by broadening outlook of and access to de facto 
"whites only" Rhodesian personnel and services/institutions was very 
rapid and far reaching - especially in agriculture to the 20% to 30% 
of African farming households who had enough reasonable quality land
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to take advantage of them. It is not unreasonable to argue that 
Senator Dennis Norman (as he then was) was Independent Africa's most 
successful Minister of Agriculture, and his starting point was of 
necessity largely inherited Rhodesian personnel, knowledge, policies 
and institutions reconceptualised and reprioritised to serve all 
Zimbabwean farming households.
9. Which also contain estimates in respect of Namibia.
10. The PDP has recognised that reducing women's workload is crucial to
increasing production. But there is, to date, virtually no data on
sectoral familial time uses for either men or women and while arguing 
by analogy from Tanzania and Malawi is adequate for conceptualization 
it is not a sufficient base for articulated programmes or targets.
11. Mozambicans - at least in print and public - rarely put it this
strongly. This is partly a national cultural trait of politeness and 
of hospitality to well-meaning guests. But it also reflects the 
distortion of dialogue inevitable when all finance for capital works 
and much of recurrent programming must be raised externally and many 
funders have said (or appeared to say) "You play our game or we will 
pick up the marbles and go home". The private fear, disappointment 
and irritation of many able Mozambicans and the (intentional or not) 
arrogance of many external experts is not hard for a sensitive 
observer to sense.
12. The package project - rehabilitation, maintenance, initial programme 
operational import content, new domestic personnel costs for several 
years - has its uses. However, calling it a project has the 
disadvantage of implying it is self-contained and self-terminating. 
This deters both serious estimation of post project period programme 
costs and Mozambican budgetary forward planning to include them post 
"project". As a result the end of the "project" phase for some rural 
"projects" has meant radical cuts in provision for extension staff, 
vehicle spares and petrol and production input supplies because 
neither the Provincial agricultural budgets nor the national import 
capacity for non-project goods could accommodate them, especially not 
without 2 year advance warning of phasings and magnitudes.
13. Mozambique is not alone. World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes 
are explicitly centred on policies and programmes and include major 
attention to recurrent programmes. But - except for one to three 
countries who have used broader external resource and budgetary 
sources/uses formats - the main document the Bank helps the country 
present to the Consultative Group Meetings is a Priority Investment 
Project Plan!
14. Why this was not clear ex ante is not self-evident. In reviewing a 
series of IRDP "prospectus" and results for IFAD in the early 1980s 
the author found in a majority of cases that significant agricultural 
output growth could not reasonably have been expected on the basis of 
the baseline data and agricultural core. In one case it might have 
been but the pattern of price (output and input) policies in place at 
the time of the prospectus was contrary to the proposed crop shifts. 
(In that case output did increase but entirely in crops not targeted 
in the IRDP but probably identifiable at the time of the prospectus 
as more economically attractive to small farmers. For "IRDP crops" 
output fell.) But, the author must admit he had read one of the
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prospectuses just before its implementation began and had not picked 
out the agricultural vacuum (hidden by hosts of hypothetical yield 
increases and adaptation rates based largely or wholly on pure desk 
speculation) at its heart at that time.
15. PDP uses a 6% output target for each District. This is a technical 
weakness. In the most secure districts with a 1980-88 record of 
rising output it may be a hard target to meet. In some of those in 
which as of 1988 war and drought devastated output, the 1992 (Year 3) 
PDP target is quite likely to be exceeded before the programme 
begins.
16. The proposals tended to range from 10 to 20 in year one and 25 to 40
in year two. The author suggested a 10, 25, 40 phasing,
17. As noted some selected (by Mozambique) expatriates were consulted -
evidently including the author - and a World Bank Mission review took 
place early in 1990 (essential if funding from the Bank or/and 
bilateral sources was to be mobilised). But the consultancy phase, 
the working group membership and the March 1990 first articulated 
"programme presentation" document were wholly Mozambican.
18. Pre 1989 studies which advised either doing so or organising worker 
co-ops with maintained state support services were largely built on 
the assumption that 50% to 75% of 1980 ranchers would have left by 
the day after independence. (Most of them did not advocate that but 
treated it as a likely "worst case".) At the time that seemed a 
likely assumption and one borne out by 1980-86 departures of about 
20%.
19. It is true that Batswana and, apparently, European ancestry 
Botswanan, large ranches are more productive and much more viable in 
economic terms than Namibian. Indeed the Namibian large ranch sector 
returns - stripped of direct and indirect state capital, interest, 
operating and residence subsidies - have rarely exceeded 5% on 
capital employed and over most of the 1980s appear to have been 
negative despite appalling and unsustainable wage levels for their 
employees. But conversion to the Botswana model would be complex and 
require expertise and experience not held by anyone in either the 
large or small ranch sectors or the agricultural service in Namibia 
today.
20. A number of Namibian ranches wholly or partly abandoned since 1980 
seem to have undergone this process informally. In these cases 
attempting an early reversal would appear unwise. If the owner 
wishes to return there is a problem. Basically it is political - 
what are the claims of an ex-rancher to abandoned land worth relative 
to those of persons now (and for some years) using it and what is the 
balance of macro reconciliation and economic costs/gains of opting 
for one set of claims or the other?
21. The problem is not expatriate personnel or even relatively large 
numbers of multilateral or bilateral agency supplied technical 
assistance personnel as such. At one point on the order of 80% of
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Botswana's public service professionals were expatriates and well 
over half provided by technical assistance. A rather mild joke on 
Botswana's policy then was "Have a headache? Take two expatriates". 
But Botswana clearly did and does ensure that expatriates (ta or 
other) serve not run Botswana and that control rests with citizens at 
both strategic decision-taking and senior official levels. How, has 
not been studied as closely as it deserves but some elements include:
a. using long stay expats virtually wholly in institutions headed by 
one or more citizens competent to judge whether technical work is 
competent and - at least as important - responsive to initial 
directions as to what was to be done to further what purposes 
(quite different competences from being able to do the work);
b. use of outside/short stay expatriate consultants to get second 
readings on in-house analysis and proposals (especially where 
these have largely been done by expatriates);
c. mixing expatriates from different sources to avoid solid
phalanxes appointed by one source (or country representative)
with a clear "party line" able to dominate an institution or a
sector;
d. being quite willing to ease out unsatisfactory expatriates 
(including aid or ta agency representatives) politely but firmly;
e. recognising that understaffing with expatriates prevents their 
having any time to work with or explain to newly appointed 
citizens and, in the end, slows the process of citizenisation or 
leaves the successor citizens inadequately on the job trained and 
experienced;
f. separating provision of personnel from solicitation of funds -
possible because Botswana has own resources, access to commercial
credit and virtually a queue of would-be aides;
g. giving priority to educating, training and "breaking in" citizens 
to increase proportion of Botswana senior personnel (not 
necessarily to reduce numbers of expats if the professional posts 
needed are growing because the size or nature of the underlying 
programme requires it) but not at the expense of quality. 
(Botswana would never in word or fact come up with the words of 
an African Airline General Manager who said he was meeting a 
shortage of engineers and senior maintenance mechanics by "A 
crash training programme".)
h. at least some examination of papers on proposed ta personnel 
(long term or consultancy), attempts to get multiple candidates 
offered and - for key posts - insistence on specific persons or 
on a Botswana right to interview and to reject proposed 
candidates.
Mozambique has been very different from Botswana because it did not 
have the personnel to achieve "a", the resources to insist on "d", 
"e», "f", or the related luxury of "g" - through no fault of its own. 
Namibia can operate on the Botswana model - indeed it has a far 
better opening ratio of trained professionals and para professionals 
to population at independence than any other Southern African country
Vexcept Zimbabwe. But the possibility will not become the achieved 
reality without a strategic decision to give priority to achieving it 
and a willingness to stand up to ta personnel providers (in some 
cases "peddlers") and expatriate personnel who have different ideas 
about their role and proper institutional modalities for carrying it 
out.
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